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Abstract
Online markets for remote labor services allow workers and firms to contract with each other di-
rectly. Despite this, intermediaries—called outsourcing agencies—have emerged in these markets. This
paper shows that agencies signal to employers that inexperienced workers are high quality. Workers
affiliated with an agency have substantially higher job-finding probabilities and wages at the beginning
of their careers compared to similar workers without an agency affiliation. This advantage declines
after high-quality non-affiliated workers receive good public feedback scores. The results indicate that
intermediaries have arisen endogenously to permit a more efficient allocation of workers to jobs.
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1 Introduction
Online hiring markets allow employers to view ratings of workers’ historical performance, but new workers
entering these markets do not have feedback or other verified performance data. In the absence of prior
experience, workers may not know their quality, or know how to communicate it to potential employers
in different countries. This paper presents evidence that organizations called outsourcing agencies have
sprung up within these markets to intermediate between workers and employers by providing information
about inexperienced worker quality.
The largest online labor market, oDesk.com, which is the setting studied in this paper, was designed
explicitly for firms to contract directly with workers, eliminating the need to send work abroad through
specialist IT-services firms.1 To the surprise of oDesk’s management, more than 1,100 small autonomous
intermediary organizations called outsourcing agencies entered the oDesk market within its first few years.
Outsourcing agencies operate within the oDesk platform, but contracting, monitoring, and work direction
still take place between employers and individual workers.
Prior to the emergence of online outsourcing markets like oDesk, Autor 2001(a) predicted that online
labor markets would require new types of intermediaries to perform two roles: first, to reduce information
frictions and, second, to increase the productivity of remote workers. The main finding in this paper is
that intermediary agencies perform the first of these roles: they reduce information frictions in the market
by screening workers and communicating the results to employers. Under an assumption that workers
and firms have symmetric information conditional on observed worker characteristics, the agencies in the
market are estimated to have improved matching efficiency by about 11 percent during the sample period.2
Their role in increasing worker productivity directly appears limited.
A brief description of oDesk and the structure of agencies provides context for the analysis. The hiring
process begins when an employer posts a job opening, looking to hire a single worker. Workers provide
hourly wage offers in their job applications, and the employer evaluates these offers alongside resume
profiles when deciding which applicant, if any, to hire. After a job ends, the employer is asked to leave
public feedback for the worker, and this feedback automatically enters the worker’s profile if payment for
the job is accepted. Figure 1 provides a sample worker profile. The top right corner of Figure 1 shows that
Evgeny M., the example worker, has excellent feedback from past jobs—scoring 5 out of 5.
1Blinder and Kruger (2009) estimate that 25 percent of U.S. jobs are potentially ”offshorable,” in part because work can
be delivered electronically. On oDesk, the market studied in this paper, over 80 percent of transactions span country borders
and constitute international services trade. As of 2013, there were over 100,000 employers and 140,000 workers actively billing
in each quarter (Agrawal, Horton, Lacetera and Lyons, 2014).
2The market inefficiency caused by lack of information about novice workers has been identified in a hiring experiment in
Pallais (2014). Her finding, along with the analysis of workers’ careers in this paper, suggests that inexperienced workers do
not have credible alternative means to signal to employers that they are high quality.
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The bottom right-hand side of Evgeny’s profile shows that he is one of 17 workers affiliated with one
of the agencies called qCode. Along with affiliation status, employers also observe the revenue-weighted
feedback score for all current and past agency members in an agency affiliate’s profile. For qCode, the
agency-level feedback is 4.95 out of 5. Agencies are typically founded by workers with past success on
oDesk, and agency founders then bring additional inexperienced workers into the market as affiliates of
their agency. Around 30 percent of non-U.S. oDesk workers are affiliated with one of the agencies operating
in the market. With 17 affiliates, the agency qCode is larger than the mean agency operating on oDesk, but
in many other respects, its organization appears representative. For example, affiliates of most agencies
know each other oﬄine and share similar backgrounds. Almost all workers affiliated with qCode are located
in the same city; attended the same local university in Siberia; and, as the agency name suggests, specialize
in technical job tasks.
All contracts between workers and firms are spot contracts, allowing both parties to renegotiate or
cancel the arrangement at any time. In contrast, agencies maintain longer relationships with affiliates, and
over 97 percent of agency relationships last for a worker’s entire oDesk career. Agencies are able to retain
workers, in part, because they have the option to remove all feedback from a worker’s profile that is received
while the worker is affiliated with the agency. oDesk introduced this feature of the contracting structure
at the request of early agency heads who wanted incentives to bring affiliates onto the platform. A worker,
hence, may lose his individual reputation if he leaves the agency. However, all feedback received by agency
affiliates is permanently included in the aggregate agency feedback score. In exchange for affiliation, agency
heads collect a fraction of workers’ earnings.
The hypothesis that agencies provide information about worker quality is evaluated using the equilib-
rium predictions from an employer learning model that adapts Tervio’s (2009) analysis of on-the-job talent
discovery to allow an agency to preempt information revelation. In the model, some workers are exoge-
nously screenable by an agency head, and in equilibrium, agency affiliation is only offered to high-quality
screenable workers. The agency is long-lived and its reputation is valuable, so employers believe agency af-
filiation conveys that workers are high-quality relative to non-affiliates. As a result, inexperienced affiliates
are predicted to have an early advantage over inexperienced non-affiliates when public information about
inexperienced workers is sparse. As employers learn about workers after information is revealed on-the-job,
the affiliate advantage is then expected to decline for affiliates when compared to experienced workers who
receive good feedback scores.3
In evaluating the prediction about inexperienced workers, Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions (Oaxaca,
3The empirical analysis of the model is in the spirit of Lange (2007), Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001).
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1973; Blinder, 1973; Fortin et al., 2011) and an entropy balancing reweighting technique (Hainmueller
2012) are used to show that inexperienced affiliates are at least 75 percent more likely to find any work;
they find jobs after less search time and effort; and they earn initial hourly wages that are 20 percent
higher than observably similar non-affiliates. An event study that examines the behavior of a subset of
workers who switch into agency affiliation is then used to show that the estimated effect of affiliation is
likely to be causal. The effect of affiliation is recovered by using time-stamped data on job applications
and the appearance of the agency brand in a worker’s profile. Workers’ wage offers increase significantly
and instantaneously when the agency brand appears in the electronic resume. The probability of finding
a job also increases despite the wage offer increase.
Consistent with the information-provision agency role, affiliates’ and non-affiliates’ subsequent careers
respond differently to the arrival of good feedback from early jobs, suggesting that good on-the-job feedback
changes employers’ beliefs more for non-affiliates than for affiliates. In regressions with worker fixed effects,
the initial affiliate wage advantage declines among workers with similar feedback scores. Experienced non-
affiliates with good feedback see a 10-percent hourly wage increase, compared to a 3-percent increase for
experienced affiliates. Employers tend not to hire experienced workers with bad feedback, and the lowest-
quality workers are selected out of the market. For experienced workers that remain in the market, wages
converge for affiliates and non-affiliates with similar feedback scores and characteristics.
Further tying this together, agencies are most prevalent in job categories where obtaining information
about worker quality is relatively difficult. For example, agency affiliates concentrate in technical job
categories. These jobs involve programming, or other tasks, where determining worker quality may require
the actual delivery of an entire completed project. In contrast, non-technical jobs tend to involve easily-
monitored tasks like data entry or personal assistant work. Around 70 percent of all the agencies observed
in the data specialize in technical work. Forty-nine percent of the new workers coming into the market
in technical job categories are agency affiliates, whereas only 18 percent of new workers in non-technical
categories are affiliated with an agency. Each of these pieces of evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that agency affiliation is most valuable when there is limited public information about worker quality.
The data also permit an assessment of Autor’s second hypothesis concerning the provision of direct
production benefits by intermediaries. For example, agency heads may provide translation services or
training that increase worker productivity on the job. Under this role, the agency advantage is predicted to
be heterogeneous and to depend on affiliated workers’ skills. There is no detectable heterogeneity consistent
with the implications of this role.4
4There is empirical evidence suggesting that market intermediaries perform varied functions in other markets. Some lit-
erature suggests that intermediaries exist in international trade to reduce the fixed costs associated with market entry or
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There is, however, some evidence that affiliates staffed on team projects receive better feedback scores
when other team members are affiliated with the same agency, consistent with the possibility that agencies
may help to coordinate teams of specialized workers (Becker and Murphy, 1992). Nonetheless, team
coordination alone does not explain the majority of the evidence about agencies: agency affiliates staffed
on individual projects earn higher wages than those on team-based projects; the share of affiliates staffed
on agency team-based projects is too small to account for the early-career agency benefits or for the wage
and employment dynamics over workers’ careers; and team based work is more frequent in non-technical
work than in technical work, but agencies are much more prevalent in technical tasks.
The existence of agencies as information providers requires that agency heads are able to capture
some of the returns from screening workers. Two institutional features of the oDesk marketplace allow
for this. First, the ability to remove affiliates’ feedback allows agency heads to have long-term contracts
with workers. This allows them to capture a return from screening potential affiliates. In contrast, when
only spot contracts are available, employers invest too little in determining inexperienced workers’ quality
because the return accrues to workers, as documented by Pallais (2014). The inability to capture the
long-term value of investment in information is the same reason that firms may be reluctant to invest in
providing general skills training (Becker, 1962) unless they have monopsony power or private information
that allows them to capture the return (Acemoglu and Pischke; 1998, 1999).
Second, the public nature of agency-level feedback makes it likely that any attempt to degrade affiliate
quality will be detected by all employers. This likely limits agency heads’ incentives to allow low-quality
affiliates into the agency and makes the information conveyed by affiliation credible to employers. Em-
pirically, new affiliates’ wages and feedback are very stable as the agency grows, but if bad feedback does
arrive, it significantly increases the likelihood that the individual agency in question ceases to bring on
new affiliates.
Relative to alternative possible screening arrangements, agencies are also likely to have a cost advantage.
The data reveal that members of an agency are likely to know each other oﬄine. Due to shared educational
or professional experience, a potential affiliate’s quality or fit with online work is likely to be known in
advance by the agency head.5 This setting shows that hiring and investment do not have to be done jointly
searching for trading partners (Ahn et al., 2011, among others). In the largest online labor market platforms, these activities
are performed by the platform itself, and employers contract directly with both agency-affiliated and non-agency-affiliated
workers. In this respect, they also differ from the temporary staffing agencies described in Autor (2001b), and in Bidwell and
Fernandez-Mateo (2010), which also provide matching functions. Recent papers on trade in goods markets study the infor-
mation provision by intermediary organizations. Feenstra and Hanson (2004) view wholesalers as certification intermediaries
that arise because of incomplete information about product quality. The dynamics of bilateral trading relationships have also
been shown to reflect the fact that partner types are initially unknown (Antras and Foley, 2014; Araujo et al., 2012). Formal
or informal institutional arrangements may also mitigate trade frictions by reducing trading-partners’ incentives to engage in
opportunistic behavior (Milgrom et al., 1990; Greif, 1993).
5Although affiliates share oﬄine ties, it is unlikely that the first-order effect of these ties is to reduce moral hazard by
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to achieve efficiency gains. This also suggests, however, that the scope of any one agency that relies on
oﬄine networks is likely to have a limited ability to increase trade in these markets, in part, because the
size of oﬄine networks constrains the extent to which an agency can grow.
By examining the reasons for the entrance of intermediaries, this paper sheds light on the potential
barriers to trade in labor services and the extent to which these barriers can be overcome (Spulber, 1999).
The main implication is that while there are information frictions in these markets, endogenously arising
market organizations may mitigate the extent to which information frictions reduce trade. This paper
complements the findings in Pallais (2014) by showing that agencies have emerged to reduce the problem
of the inefficient allocation of talent to job openings. The total gains from the presence of intermediaries
in the marketplace appear substantial when considering firms’ willingness to pay for agency affiliates.
Affiliates comprise 32 percent of the inexperienced workers hired, and they earn 50-percent more over their
careers than observably similar non-affiliates.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the empirical setting for the paper. Section 3 presents
a simple model to illustrate the agency information-provision role. Section 4 includes the empirical analysis
that provides evidence this agency role. Section 5 discusses alternative possible intermediation roles and
the implications of the results for online labor markets and more general settings. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Setting
oDesk is a spot market for remote work that was established in 2005. It has grown to become the largest
global online labor market.6 Agrawal, Horton, Lacetera, and Lyons (2014) document that as of early 2013,
the total wage bill on oDesk was around $95 million per quarter and was growing rapidly. Over 90 percent
of the wage bill comes from employers in high income countries while workers in low income countries
receive about 75 percent of the total wages paid.7 This paper uses proprietary transactions data from
oDesk, and this section describes how a transaction comes takes place and is recorded in the data.
increasing the social costs of shirking. Employed workers face strong individual reputational incentives within the oDesk
market to refrain from shirking, as feedback scores are the single most important factor associated with ongoing employment
and earnings in the market. The role of social ties among members of these organizations, therefore, appears to differ from
the role played by social ties in other settings, such as the rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas) studied in Besley
et al. (1993).
6Many features of oDesk described in the introduction, like the posting of feedback and the visibility of job histories, are
shared by other online labor markets. The main feature distinguishing oDesk from other similar markets is that payments
to workers for legitimate hours billed are guaranteed. This guarantee arises because oDesk provides proprietary monitoring
and productivity software that allows employers to remotely view a contractor’s computer; employers then have the ability to
dispute pay. oDesk handles all wage payments and retains ten percent of each transaction.
7Only a small fraction of employers in high income countries are likely to have migrated from the countries staffing jobs.
As Ghani, Kerr, and Stanton (2014) report, less than five percent of American employers in the oDesk database have ethnic
Indian last names even though 28 percent of all jobs originating from the United States are staffed in India.
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When posting a new job, an employer fills out a description of the task, the skills required, and the
expected project duration.8 Employers classify their posting into one of several unique job categories,
and these tasks broadly fall into two types of work: technical and non-technical. Technical jobs require
specialized skills, and for many technical projects, the output is a website, a software application, or a
specialized deliverable that can be verified to work only toward the end of an entire project. In contrast,
non-technical jobs often involve work that is easy-to-monitor at any point.9 About half of all job postings
during the sample involve technical jobs, but the share of non-technical job posts increased as oDesk began
marketing for administrative support related tasks.
On the worker side, job seekers fill out resume profiles that employers can browse through and that
appear along with an hourly wage offer in a job application. These profiles typically include a biographical
sketch, a description of the worker’s education, skills, and experience, and the job category of desired work.
Workers can also take tests online to demonstrate competence in individual subject areas. The tests range
from English language and writing skills to web development knowledge to the ability to use tools for
database administration. Workers have the option to conceal test scores or to post them publicly. There is
no verification process that reveals the number of times a given test has been taken or that the worker in
question actually took the test him or herself. After a hire is made, an indication that the worker has been
hired is immediately entered into the worker’s online resume. Feedback from the job arrives after a project
ends and this feedback is automatically affixed to the worker’s profile if any payments are accepted. After
a worker gains experience, the profile page contains data on wages, hours, and feedback from prior jobs.
When oDesk was founded, all workers entered the market without agency affiliation. As the market
matured, agencies began to enter, and oDesk accommodated this entry by displaying agency affiliation and
the agency feedback score within a worker’s profile. It is important to note that affiliation is a characteristic
that appears on a worker’s resume profile, as shown in Figure 1, but does not alter the job application,
hiring, or work processes. Through oDesk’s monitoring system, the employer observes exactly which
individual employee does the work, whether or not the worker is agency affiliated.
The modal agency contains a small number of workers, often from the same region or city. Conversations
with oDesk’s management emphasized that agency affiliates tend to know each other oﬄine and that
affiliates tend to have similar backgrounds. In exchange for affiliation, a share of affiliates’ wages are
transferred to the agency. This transfer is not observed in the data because it happens outside of oDesk,
8Employers can also choose whether to specify hourly-paying or fixed-price contracts. During the sample period considered
here, hourly-paying contracts were more prevalent. Fixed-price contracts tended to involve small budgets and were concentrated
in non-technical job categories.
969 percent of technical jobs are posted in the web development category followed by the next largest category, software
development, at 17 percent. Around 56 percent of non-technical tasks are posted in the administrative support category which
includes data entry, web research, and virtual personal assistance tasks.
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but oDesk’s internal research about agencies suggests that, on average, agency heads collect around five to
six percent of affiliates’ wages.10
As mentioned in the introduction, the agency head has ownership rights over an affiliated worker’s
individual feedback as part of the affiliation process. For workers who wish to leave an agency, the agency
head has the right to scrub the worker’s individual feedback score. However, the feedback of any worker
who does work under an agency brand is permanently attached to the agency’s collective reputation.
3 Motivating Framework
This section introduces worker certification by an agency into a simple version of Tervio’s (2009) model
of a labor market in which ability is revealed on-the-job. It provides testable predictions about how the
effect of certification on job-finding probabilities and wages varies over workers’ careers.
Players. There are three categories of participants in the market: workers, firms, and an agency.11
Workers live two periods and enter the market in overlapping generations, while the agency and firms are
infinitely lived. At the end of each period, E old workers exit the market. When the next period begins,
they are replaced by E new workers resulting in a a total of 2E potential workers during any period.
Workers’ per-period outside wages are normalized to zero. Each worker’s permanent quality, θ, takes one
of two values, High (H) or Low (L), but upon entry into the market, a worker does not know her particular
value of θ. She knows only that θ = H with probability h, and θ = L with probability 1 − h. Individual
realizations of θ are revealed through on-the-job experience after a worker is employed, and once a worker’s
θ is revealed, it becomes public information. Workers’ types are also indexed by a second dimension, s,
which indicates whether or not a worker is ”screenable” by the agency. This takes one of two values: 0
(not-screenable) or 1 (screenable). Types θ and s are distributed independently.
The agency is infinitely lived and may offer ”affiliation” to each worker in exchange for a fee from
that worker. The fee may be a lump-sum paid in advance, a lump-sum spread across periods, or an ad-
valorem percentage of affiliates’ earnings. Affiliation is simply a public signal associated with an individual
worker that is observed by all players. On its own, affiliation has no productive value. Workers offered
agency affiliation choose whether to accept the offer. The agency is relevant in the market because it it
can observe the quality type θ of a screenable worker before that worker has on-the-job experience. The
10oDesk does not collect data on the contract between agencies and agency-affiliated workers, and all payments between
agency affiliates and agency heads happen oﬄine. Qualitative details about these contracts come from discussions between
agency heads and oDesk staff. Conversations with oDesk’s management and John Horton, oDesk’s former staff economist,
suggested that the agency share of a worker’s wages tends to fall as the worker gains experience.
11Including only one agency in the model mirrors the fact that agencies appear to have a local monopoly in their ability to
screen connected workers.
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parameter a denotes the exogenously determined share of workers that are screenable by the agency. The
agency is assumed to be somewhat patient, and it maximizes the stream of discounted payoffs from the
fees that it collects from affiliates.
In each period there are N identical firms that can hire, at most, one worker. If a firm hires a worker of
type θ, it produces gross output θ and must pay the worker the contracted wage. If a firm does not hire it
produces zero. Firms are able to observe the following about workers: when the worker entered the market,
any historical output and, hence, quality information, and whether the worker is affiliated with an agency.
Whether a worker is screenable by the agency, and the outcome of any screening, are not observable to
firms. Firms are assumed to maximize per period profits, equal to the value of output less the wage paid
to the employed worker.
Contracts. Firms and workers are restricted to one-period spot employment contracts that pay a fixed
wage. The set of possible contracts between the agency and individual workers is a bit more detailed. In
each period that the worker is affiliated, the contract between an agency and an individual affiliate specifies
a fee, βt, to be paid to the agency, where t ∈ {1, 2} refers to the period of the worker’s life. The worker
or the agency can unilaterally dissolve affiliation at the beginning of any period. The agency contract also
specifies ownership rights to a worker’s public feedback history. For workers with past work experience
under an affiliation agreement, the agency contract contains an option to remove the public record of
feedback for workers who opt to leave affiliation.
Timing. The timing within each period is as follows:
1. E new workers enter the marketplace to join the E existing workers starting the second period of their
lives.
2. The agency screens workers. The agency offers affiliation to a subset of the 2E workers under the
fee-schedule defined by the contract βt. Workers offered agency affiliation choose whether to affiliate
and pay the agency any contracted fee.
3. As a reduced form way to specify how the market clears, it is assumed that the N firms submit demand
schedules to a market-clearing authority. Firms can condition these schedules on workers’ wage offers
and three dimensions of observable worker characteristics: quality, H, L, or U , where U signifies an
inexperienced worker whose quality is unknown; A or N, signifying whether the workers is an affiliate
or non-affiliate; and t ∈ {1, 2} , for the period of a worker’s life. These schedules are preference
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rankings, and firms also rank a preference for not hiring. 12
4. Each worker submits a wage offer to the market-clearing authority.
5. The market clearing authority selects a firm at random and then assigns the firm the best available
worker given the demand schedule. In the event of ties, workers with known high quality are assigned
first, followed by agency affiliates, followed by workers of unknown type, followed by workers with
known low quality. This is repeated until all firms have been assigned a worker.
6. Production takes place and the quality of all newly-employed workers is revealed.
7. E workers exit the marketplace.
3.1 Equilibrium
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium without Intermediation. Setting a = 0, such that there are no screenable
workers, establishes a benchmark without the agency. Equilibrium firm-worker matches and wages are
derived using a condition similar to that in Tervio (2009), such that jobs are scarce relative to workers, but
known high quality workers are scarce relative to jobs. This condition is that the number of job openings is
larger than the number of known high quality workers and is smaller than the number of new workers plus
the number of known high quality workers. Precise mathematical details are provided in the appendix.
In steady state, only two classes of workers are hired. All experienced workers revealed to be high
quality from prior experience are hired in the second period of their lives; the remaining workers matched
to jobs are inexperienced. Observed wages are relatively high for workers with job experience, reflecting
the positive selection of high types over time, while wages are lower for inexperienced workers, reflecting
uncertainty about their types. Because workers in the second period of their lives are revealed high types,
they experience wage growth. Workers revealed to be low types earn their outside wage of zero in the
second period and are not re-employed.
To pin down the exact difference in wages by experience, the assumption made about the number
of firms and the fraction of workers of each type implies that equilibrium wages make firms indifferent
between hiring known high types at wage wH and hiring an unknown worker at wage wU . Because workers
12As an example, a firm could submit a preference ranking of:
max (H − wH2, H − wA1, H − wAH2, L− wAL2, H − wAU2, L− wL2, hH + (1 − h)L− wU1, hH + (1 − h)L− wU2, 0)
where H,L, h, and l are constants and wH2, wA1, wAH2, wAL2, wAU2, wL2, wU1, wU2 are, respectively, the wages of a known
high type in the second period, an agency affiliate in the first period, an agency affiliate revealed to be a high type in the
second period, an agency affiliate revealed to be a low type in the second period, an agency affiliate in the second period with
no revealed type, a known low type in the second period, an unknown type in the first period, and an unknown type in the
second period.
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are abundant relative to firms, the equilibrium wage for workers of unknown quality, wU , is determined
by the expected lifetime indifference condition for these workers: (wU + hwH) = 0. Upon finding a job
and gaining one period of experience, with probability h, the worker receives wH in period two. Workers
not selected in the first period of their lives are passed-over in favor of new workers who are willing to
accept low wages for the chance to earn higher subsequent wages. This means that revealed low types and
unknown-type workers in the second period of their lives are never hired in this equilibrium. This gives
wU = −hwH . Equilibrium wages for high types are determined by a system of two equations for workers’
and firms’ indifference conditions, respectively: wU = −hwH and hH+(1− h)L−wU = H−wH , yielding
wH = (1−h)(1+h)(H − L) and wU = −h (1−h)(1+h)(H − L). Workers who find employment in both periods of their
lives experience a wage increase from wU to wH .
Total output with no agency equals the number of high types times their quality plus the number of
unkown types times their expected quality. In steady-state, total output is:
Y =
(
2hH + (1− h)L
(1 + h)
)
N.
In Tervio (2009), inefficiency in the market equilibrium comes about because mediocre experienced
workers crowd out inexperienced new workers. In contrast, with just two types, the market allocation here
is constrained efficient given the information available to workers and firms. When there is an alternative
organization like an agency that allows for screening and certification prior to information revelation on-
the-job, this allocation can be improved. The efficiency gains from the presence of agencies are split between
the agency and screenable, high-quality workers.
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with Agency Intermediation. Letting a > 0 enables the agency to screen
a subset of workers. To illustrate differences in the dynamics of careers between agency affiliates and non-
affiliates, we focus on an equilibrium under conditions that guarantee that some non-affiliates are hired.
Precise mathematical details are provided again provided in the appendix.
There is a constrained-efficient perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which the agency offers affiliation to
screened high type workers inexperienced workers the market under the contract βt, derived below. The
agency does not offer affiliation to screened low types or to unscreened workers. Workers offered affiliation
accept and remain affiliates for both periods of their lifetimes. On the equilibrium path, firms believe that
agency affiliates are high types with probability one.
In steady state, the following workers are matched to jobs: all agency affiliates in the first period of
their lives; all agency affiliates in the second period of their lives; all known high types in the second period
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of their lives; some unscreened workers of unknown types in the first period of their lives. No other workers
are hired in equilibrium.
Equilibrium wages for agency affiliates in both periods of their lives, wA, equal the wages of experienced
workers revealed to be high types. That is, wH = wA > 0 > wU . Wages are wU for those non-affiliates
who find jobs as inexperienced workers. If a non-affiliate is revealed to be a high-type, wages change from
wU to wH , while wages for agency affiliates are constant in both periods.13,14
This equilibrium generates several empirical predictions for worker-level outcomes.
1. Affiliates are more likely to be hired at the start of their career than non-affiliates; affiliates submit
higher initial wage offers and earn higher initial wages than non-affiliates who find employment.
2. Among workers who find jobs, affiliates are more likely to be re-employed than non-affiliates; those
non-affiliates who are re-employed experience higher wage growth than re-employed affiliates, closing
the initial wage gap.
The contract between affiliates and the agency is not uniquely determined across time periods. In
equilibrium, the best the agency can do is extract the difference between wU and wH from an affiliate, but
the payment can happen across periods or in a single lump-sum. The reason that the agency cannot do
better is that, by offering affiliation to the worker, the agency allows the worker to infer that he is a
high-type. The worker can then use this informational advantage outside of affiliation by offering a wage
slightly below wU , guaranteeing employment while inexperienced, and earning a high wage with certainty
in the second period. Specifying that the agency takes all revenue as a lump-sum prior to any hiring means
that there is no distortion or incentive for workers to leave the agency in the second period. In this case,
β1 = (1 + h)w
H , with β2 = 0.
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The agency increases output in every period because its presence increases the share of employed high
types. The equilibrium number of known high types and expected high types through affiliation is given by
EHA = 2ahE+h(N−EHA), where 2ahE is the total number of affiliates in the market, and h(N−EHA) is
13Because of the assumptions governing the number of firms relative to the number of known high types and agency affiliates,
equilibrium wages are determined by the same system of equations for indifference conditions as in the equilibrium without
the agency. Screened workers who are not offered agency affiliation offer zero wages because the failure to be offered affiliation
means that these workers infer they are low-types. There is thus no upside from having their type revealed. Unscreened
workers with unknown types in the first period of their lives offer the same wages as in the equilibrium without an agency.
14Other models of employer-employee matching with incomplete information offer different testable predictions that are not
present here. For example, Lockwood (1991) allows firms to test potential workers for quality and hire only productive workers.
As a consequence, unemployment duration is a signal of low quality. The equilibrium level of testing in the economy can be
inefficient. In the model presented here, unemployment duration does not provide information directly, although non-affiliates
tend to be lower-quality and are also less likely to become employed. In another example, Chiappori et al. (1999) model wage
dynamics with learning about workers in the presence of wage rigidity, where recent wage growth provides some information
about worker type. In the model in this paper, with only two worker types, the mechanism is simpler–once employed for one
period, a worker’s type is fully revealed.
15This gives total per-period agency revenues of ahE(1− h)(H − L).
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the number of employed unknown types in the previous period revealed to be high-quality and who remain
in the market in the second period of their lives. Total output in each period is:
Y =
(
2hH + (1− h)L
1 + h
)
N +
(1− h)2ahE(H − L)
1 + h
.16
The increase in output when a > 0, compared to when a = 0 and there is no agency, is given by the
second term in this equation, (1−h)2ahE(H−L)1+h > 0. This term is increasing in the share of entering workers
screenable by the agency, a, as well as in the difference in output between high- and low-type workers,
(H − L).
Assuming the agency is sufficiently patient, the agency never deviates from the equilibrium, and the
quality of affiliated workers is independent of agency size. The beliefs required for this equilibrium are
reasonable: if there has never been a defection by the agency, firms believe all agency affiliates are high
types with probability one, separating inexperienced affiliated workers from other inexperienced workers.
If a deviation ever occurs and firms detect that the agency has let in a worker who is revealed to be a
low type, the firms permanently believe that all future affiliates are high types with probability h, the
population-level probability that a worker is high-quality. If this occurs, affiliation offers no benefits to
individual workers, and the number of new or future agency affiliates falls to zero. This equilibrium agency
behavior suggests the following empirical prediction:
3. Agencies do not allow low-quality workers into the agency. If an agency affiliate receives poor feedback,
it increases the likelihood that the agency in question never has new affiliates join.
The three predictions are evaluated in the remainder of the paper.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 The Data
Proprietary data to evaluate these predictions were obtained directly from the oDesk production databases.
Although oDesk began operations in 2005, the data used here cover the period August 1, 2008 through
December 28, 2009. Earlier data are not incorporated because changes to the database that records agency
affiliation meant that it was not possible to track agency records prior to this period.17 There are 1,126
16This is calculated by simplifying EHAH + (N − EHA)(hH + (1 − h)L) where EHA = h1+h (N + 2aE).
17A separate database query contains the extended employment histories up to the later date of 8/14/2010. This data is
referred to in the paper as the extended sample.
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separate agencies with at least one new non-U.S. affiliate active between August 1, 2008 and December
28, 2009 and 872, or 77 percent, of these agencies have complete observable histories because they were
founded after oDesk implemented its detailed tracking system for agency affiliation. Table 1 presents
summary statistics about these organizations. An average of 3.25 unique workers per agency are employed
during the 16-month period covered. The smallest agency contains just one worker and the largest contains
76 employed workers. On average, during the 16 months of data, 2.87 new affiliates for whom it is possible
to track the entirety of a worker’s career as an affiliate are employed per agency.
While the majority of employers are located in the United States, agencies are most prominent in
developing countries. It is rare to observe affiliation in the U.S., which hosts only one percent of the
agencies in the sample. India or Pakistan is the modal country for 52 percent of agencies, followed by the
Philippines at 14 percent and Russia or the Ukraine at 11 percent. The affiliates of a given agency also
tend to be concentrated in the same country, consistent with the hypothesis that agency affiliates appear
to know the agency head from non-oDesk interactions. Taking the mean across agencies, 98 percent of
employed affiliates are located in the modal country of their respective agencies.
Agency affiliates are similarly concentrated by type of work, with an average of 84 percent of hires in
the modal technical or non-technical classification for the agency in question. Most agencies concentrate
in technical tasks, as 69 percent of all agencies have modal jobs in technical categories. The concentration
by country and type of work are related–agencies specializing in technical work are disproportionately
prevalent in India or Pakistan.
Table 2 presents summary statistics where workers are the unit of analysis. In the main sample, there
are 83,029 workers located outside of the U.S. who created a resume profile and applied for at least one
job during the sample period.18 Thirteen percent, or 10,751, of these new workers were affiliated with
an outsourcing agency on their first job application. Affiliation is again relatively prevalent among new
oDesk workers in India and Russia compared to workers in the Philippines. Mirroring the concentration
of agencies in technical job categories, relative to non-affiliates, affiliates are far more likely to be technical
workers. 68 percent of new affiliates apply for technical work while just 34 percent of new non-affiliates
apply for technical jobs.19
The remaining rows in the first two columns of Table 2 provide summary measures detailing how non-
18Restricting the sample to exclude US workers retains 79 percent of all jobs for inexperienced workers. Of the 2,663 U.S.
workers who were hired, only 159 were agency affiliates. This paper focuses on contracts that span international borders and
so the analysis concentrates on non-U.S. workers. The main results are generally unchanged if workers from the U.S. are
included in the analysis after accounting for heterogeneity across country. Online Appendix Table 1 presents some summary
statistics including workers from the U.S.
19While 10, 751 workers are agency affiliates at the time of their first job application, 1, 433 workers apply for jobs as
non-affiliates and then join an agency. This group of workers’ job-application behavior is analyzed in detail later in the paper.
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affiliates and affiliates differ on a subset of the observable characteristics used in the empirical analysis.
The full list and definition of the observable worker characteristics that are used subsequently is given in
Appendix Table 1. New affiliates are more likely to have a bachelors or higher degree than new non-affiliates
and are also more likely to have good English language skills. They are marginally less likely to have taken
at least one of the skills tests that oDesk provides. Importantly, affiliates make significantly higher initial
hourly wage offers. The average initial log hourly wage offer of a non-affiliate is 1.94, compared to an initial
affiliate log hourly wage offer of 2.15. Online Appendix Table 2 details information about the distribution
of test scores for different tests, and the differences between affiliates and non-affiliates.
4.2 Affiliation and Earnings
Agency affiliates earn significantly more than non-affiliates over their careers. The final three rows of
Table 2 compare total earnings between the groups. The affiliates earned an average of $1, 787 between
the date that they first applied for a job and August 14, 2010, the last date in the extended sample. The
72, 278 non-affiliates in the sample earned an average of $387 over the same period, less than one quarter
of affiliates’ earnings.
It is possible that a portion of this $1,400 gap in mean earnings between affiliates and non-affiliates is
due to differences in observable characteristics that potential employers value. The Oaxaca-Blinder method
is used to decompose the gap into: (a) a portion of the mean difference between affiliates and non-affiliates
that can be attributed to a detailed set of observable resume and job characteristics and entry cohort fixed
effects; and (b) an unexplained portion that can be attributed to agency affiliation. The model for outcome
yi (here, total earnings for worker i) is given by a linear regression yi = XiβN + εi for a non-affiliate and
by yi = XiβA+εi for an affiliate. The subscripts N and A indicate that the coefficients correspond to non-
affiliates and affiliates, respectively. The vector Xi contains a constant term along with individual worker
characteristics from the resume profile, including test scores.20 Fixed effects for workers’ countries are
included to capture differences in outside opportunities; job category fixed effects are included to capture
differences in the market price of individual skills; and cohort effects, corresponding to the calendar month
of the first job application, capture differences in career horizons and macroeconomic fluctuations in market
conditions.
The gap in average outcomes between affiliates and non-affiliates due to differences in observable charac-
teristics is measured as
(
X¯A − X¯N
)
βN . X¯A and X¯N are the mean characteristics for each group. Holding
20The resume characteristics consist of dummies for levels of educational attainment, prior years of work experience, prior
programming experience, the oDesk test scores that are observed in workers’ profiles, measures of English language ability,
and any observable work history on small fixed-price contracts. These variables are described in Appendix Table 1.
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observable characteristics for both groups constant, taking the difference in means, and ”weighting” this
difference in characteristics by βN provides an estimate of the mean difference in outcomes attributed
to differences in observable characteristics other than affiliation status.21 The remaining difference in
outcomes, X¯A (βA − βN ), captures that employers value the same observable characteristics differently in
affiliates and non-affiliates. This latter component is due to agency affiliation or to other factors correlated
with agency affiliation but excluded from Xi. The presence of a constant term in Xi captures the mean
difference in the outcome across groups, but the specification does not restrict differences due to affiliation
to be captured in the estimated constant terms. The weights on education, English language ability, prior
labor-market experience, or any other characteristic may differ for an affiliate versus a non-affiliate.
With these quantities in hand, the premium from affiliation is
Premium =
YBase + X¯A (βA − βN )
YBase
(1)
where YBase is a baseline outcome and the numerator is the baseline plus the effect of affiliation due to
affiliation itself. Several values are possible for the baseline outcome. For example, the premium relative to
the group of non-affiliates uses X¯NβN as the baseline outcome.
In the decomposition, only 30 percent of the $1,400 earnings gap is explained by the detailed set of
observable resume and job characteristics data, Xi, while 70 percent is attributed to agency affiliation
or factors unobserved by the econometrician but correlated with agency affiliation. Using this estimate
to calculate an earnings premium from affiliation suggests that the effect of affiliation on workers’ career
earnings is substantial: new affiliates earn a premium over the wages of non-affiliates that is equivalent to
251 percent of a non-affiliate’s average earnings.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 analyze career outcomes for workers who are employed for at least one job.
Restricting the sample to workers that are hired, the pattern with respect to observable characteristics
is reversed: in this subsample, non-affiliates have higher levels of observable skills. Among this subset of
workers, affiliates’ earnings advantage narrows: they earn twice as much as non-affiliates in the raw data,
the share of the earnings gap that can be attributed to affiliation also falls to 50 percent, and the affiliation
premium for career earnings, relative to the non-affiliate earnings baseline, drops to 40 percent.
The analysis in Columns 5 and 6 further restricts the sample to workers who have been hired more than
once. Among these workers, levels of observable skills increase slightly for both affiliates and non-affiliates,
and non-affiliates continue to have higher average skills levels. For these workers, the affiliation earnings
21Oaxaca and Ransom (1999) show that the share of the outcome attributed to agency affiliation in this decomposition is
invariant with respect to the omitted dummy variable.
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premium falls to 26 percent.22
The comparison of Columns 1 and 2, with Columns 3 and 4, and then with Columns 5 and 6, suggests
that the career earnings affiliation premium is, in large part, due to outcomes at the start of workers’
careers. As will be shown, it arises primarily on the extensive margin of ”landing the first job.” For the
workers who are employed for several jobs, the affiliation earnings premium is substantially diminished.
4.3 Early Career Advantages
4.3.1 The First Job
Table 3 examines whether the outcomes from the start of workers’ careers are consistent with the first
set of model predictions: inexperienced agency affiliates are more likely to find jobs while earning higher
wages and better feedback upon employment. Entropy balancing estimates are presented in the table
as well as Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. This technique provides an alternative to the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition that reweights observations of affiliates and non-affiliates to balance the moments of the
distributions of observable characteristics between the two groups (Hainmueller, 2012). The procedure takes
the distribution of affiliate characteristics as given and then finds weights for each non-affiliate such that
the weighted distribution of non-affiliate characteristics matches the distribution of affiliate characteristics
as closely as possible. Weighted regression with an affiliation dummy then provides an estimate of the
affiliation effect for workers with characteristics that match the characteristics of the affiliate distribution.
Because the regression is weighted to reflect the distribution of affiliate characteristics, the reported constant
is the expected counterfactual outcome for affiliates in the absence of affiliation. The affiliation premium
from equation (1) is calculated relative to this base for the entropy balancing estimates. These estimates
also allow an assessment of the sensitivity of the Oaxaca-Blinder estimates when the dependent variable
is binary and there are multiple categories of fixed effects.
The first column of Table 3 shows that 27 percent of the 10,751 affiliates in the sample find at least one
job, compared to only ten percent of non-affiliates. In Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, observable charac-
teristics, while correlated with employment outcomes, explain only 27.6 percent of the mean difference in
the probability of finding a job. The remaining 72.4 percent can be attributed to agency affiliation. This
implies that affiliates are 121 percent more likely to find a job than the non-affiliate baseline. Under the
reweighting estimate, affiliates are 75 percent more likely to find a job relative to the counterfactual of
being in the pool of non-affiliates.
Columns 2 and 3 examine the elapsed time and the number of applications made prior to the first hire
22This is calculated for workers’ earnings after the second job, excluding their earnings on the first job.
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for workers that find at least one job. At the median for affiliates, five days elapse between the first job
application and the first hire, with a median of three job applications. The corresponding figures for non-
affiliates are thirteen days and ten job applications. To examine these differences in more detail, Figure 2
expands the sample to consider all job seekers, and separately plots the empirical cumulative job-finding
hazard for affiliates and non-affiliates as a function of the number of job applications submitted. It is clear
that affiliates find their first jobs with less search time elapsed. The pattern is similar when controlling
for observable differences that may be correlated with agency affiliation and allowing for censored spells of
job search in Cox and Weibull models, as shown in Appendix Table 2. A model that does not account for
information frictions or heterogeneity across workers would predict the exact opposite of these results—
that search durations increase with wage offers. However, affiliates submit higher wage offers and are also
more likely to land jobs. Consistent with the model’s predictions, an affiliate’s initial unemployment spell
is much shorter than a similar non-affiliate’s.
Column 4 of Table 3 examines differences in log hourly wages on the first job for workers who are hired
at least once. Consistent with the empirical predictions of the model, affiliates receive higher initial hourly
wages. Because the dependent variable is in logarithms, the estimate of the average effect of affiliation in
levels is around 20 percent.
With regard to differences in job outcomes, Column 5 shows that affiliates’ first jobs last around 60-
percent longer in terms of hours worked. Employers are asked the expected duration of the project and the
expected hours of work per week, and these are included as controls in the analysis.23 This result shows
that, within projects of a given expected duration, employers are willing to continue the employment of
inexperienced affiliates for a longer time. Employers do not exercise the option to terminate affiliates’
contracts early.
Column 6 examines employers’ assessments of whether a completed project was a success. This measure
is collected from an internal survey and is not shared with the public or the worker. The sample excludes
ongoing projects, and, among completed jobs, 62 percent of affiliates’ first projects are considered successful,
compared to 57 percent of non-affiliates’ first projects. The estimate of the affiliation effect is ten percent in
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and 12 percent in the entropy balancing estimates. That is, on average,
affiliates are more likely than observably similar non-affiliates to be successful on their first projects.
The final two columns in Table 3 present an analysis in which the dependent variable indicates whether
the feedback score received on the first job exceeds 4.5 on a 5-point scale. In both Columns 7 and 8,
23For ongoing jobs, the hours worked are recorded at the end of the sample period. The groupings for expected duration are:
less than one week; less than one month; 1 to 3 months; 3 to 6 months; and ongoing or more than 6 months. There are three
groupings for expected hours per week: full-time (40 hours), between 20-40 hours, and less than 20 hours. Each specification
in Columns 2 to 8 contains controls for hours per week × expected duration.
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ongoing projects are excluded. When workers do not receive feedback, the dependent variable in Column
7 is coded as a zero, whereas the sample in Column 8 is restricted to those workers who receive a feedback
score.24 Sixty-nine percent of affiliates who received feedback obtained a score of at least 4.5, compared to
68 percent of non-affiliates. The estimates suggest that affiliates receive feedback that is about 2.7 to four
percent higher after accounting for differences in observable characteristics.
Panels B and C present the same results for the subset of workers with initial job applications in
technical and non-technical categories, respectively. Column 1 shows that affiliates in technical work are
more likely to be hired at least once than non-affiliates, relative to the same outcomes in non-technical work.
Under the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the estimated agency affiliation premium is larger in technical
work, although the reweighting estimates of the premium are similar in both technical and non-technical
work. The difference in some other first-job outcomes—most notably, the speed of hire and the number of
applications prior to initial hire—between inexperienced affiliates and non-affiliates, both with and without
controlling for the differences attributable to observable characteristics, is greater among technical workers.
These results are shown in Columns 2 and 3.
Column 4 of Panels B and C show that the percentage difference in initial wages for affiliates and non-
affiliates is larger in non-technical jobs, but the difference in levels is largest in technical jobs. The findings
for first job duration, presented in Column 5, are similar across technical and non-technical workers. In
Column 6, the estimated magnitudes of the agency effect on job success—which is one key measure of worker
quality—are far larger for technical than non-technical work. From the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the
agency effect in technical work is around 14 percent, compared to only four percent in non-technical job
categories. For the feedback measures, shown in Columns 7 and 8, there is a positive agency effect in
technical work, but, for non-technical categories, non-affiliates are actually more likely than affiliates to
receive good feedback.
These results are broadly consistent with the predictions about wages, job-finding probabilities, and
job outcomes early in workers’ careers, particularly for workers employed in technical work where skill
assessment may be difficult. The next section assesses whether the early career advantage, as estimated
here, is likely to be caused by agency affiliation.
24There are two main reasons why the success and feedback measures may be missing. The first is that the job is ongoing,
and the second is that the job is finished but the employer chose not to submit this information. While the former reason is
likely to be correlated with good on-the-job performance, the latter is likely to be correlated with poor worker performance.
Rather than infer information from the fact that these measures are missing for some workers, the analysis concentrates on the
subset of workers with available performance data. Subsequent analysis accounts for employer non-response to these questions.
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4.3.2 Switchers’ Wages and Employment Probabilities Both Increase
While the estimates account for an extensive set of observable worker characteristics, it is possible that
affiliation is correlated with an omitted characteristic about workers that is observed and valued by em-
ployers. Most agency affiliates are brought onto oDesk by the agency head and do not apply for jobs
without observable agency affiliation in their profiles. However, there are 1, 433 workers who switch into
agency affiliation while searching for their first job but after applying for some jobs as non-affiliates. This
enables the use of event studies to estimate the information-provision effect of agency affiliation on wage
offers.
Because workers apply for many jobs, often over a short time interval, the estimated agency-affiliation
effect on wage offers is identified using only a small window around the appearance of the agency brand in
a workers’ resume profile. The estimating equation is:
logWage Offerit = αi + β1 (Affiliateit) + β2AppNumberit + β3f (TimeFromFirstAppit) + εit, (2)
where αi are worker fixed effects and β1 measures the effect of the appearance of the agency brand on
workers’ wage offers. Controls for the application number and the function f (TimeFromFirstAppit), a
cubic polynomial capturing the elapsed time since a worker first began applying for jobs, capture potential
trends in wage offers and the intensity of application behavior.
Table 4 presents the results from estimating equation 2 using various time windows around the switch
into agency affiliation. Out of the 1, 433 switchers, there are 1, 381 workers with job applications in a four-
day window around a switch into agency affiliation. This gives about 6.2 applications per worker, enough to
separately identify a worker’s fixed effect and pre-affiliation wage offer behavior from the agency-affiliation
effect. The baseline estimate in Column 1 shows that agency affiliation is associated with an 8.6-percent
increase in the wage at which an inexperienced worker offers to work. Column 2 contains a falsification
test using this same sample. A randomly generated placebo agency switching date was generated for each
worker in the pre-switch period and was included as a ”false indicator” that the worker switched into
the agency as of this time. If agency switchers’ wage offers followed a positive trend not picked up by
the controls for time and application number, then the placebo date should capture reflect the possibility
that the response happens before the arrival of the agency brand in the workers’ profile. The estimated
coefficient on the placebo is small and is not statistically significant. The specification in Column 3 includes
both the placebo switching indicator and the indicator for the actual appearance of the agency brand. The
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estimate of the agency effect is almost identical to the estimate in Column 1, without the placebo.25
These results suggest that the effect of agency affiliation on inexperienced workers’ wage offers is nearly
instantaneous. Workers who join agencies appear to apply for jobs as if they understand the increased
probability of employment as affiliates, even at higher wage offers.
Other event studies are also possible. Estimates from the public revelation of test scores do not have
the same positive effects, making it unlikely that the estimates of the effect of affiliation are driven by the
simple act of adding details to workers’ online resumes.26
It is possible to use these estimates to assess bounds on the causal effect of affiliation on wages in
terms of the initial premium. The agency wage-offer premium for agency switchers is 11.5 percent in a
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.27 With these results in hand, suppose that this estimate of 11.5 percent
is itself composed of the true affiliation effect plus a component due to model misspecification or omitted
variables observable to employers. Using the smallest and largest estimates from Table 4, agency affiliation
itself is responsible for between (.0724/.115) = 63 percent and (.0868/.115) = 75 percent of the affiliation
wage-offer premium. Thus, after accounting for worker fixed effects over a short time window, a large
fraction of the original effect attributed to agency affiliation appears to be due to the presence of the
agency brand itself. Under an assumption that the ratio of the true affiliation effect due to misspecification
or an omitted variable in the wage offer data is the same for the initial wages paid to hired workers, the
affiliation effect itself is responsible for between 63 and 75 percent of the 23.1 percent agency first-job wage
premium—or 14.5 to 17.3 percent.
Does a demand shift for inexperienced affiliates cause part of the increase in wage offers for switchers,
or is the effect driven by the incidence of agency fees? It is possible that wage offers after switching simply
reflect pass-through of the agency share of newly affiliated workers’ wages just as a tax on goods increases
the price of those goods. A standard incidence analysis, holding underlying demand and other costs fixed,
predicts that quantities would fall as prices rise. If, on the other hand, job-finding probabilities increase
25These findings are robust to also including job-category fixed effects (Columns 4 and 5), and to using a three-day rather
than a four-day window (Column 6). Column 7 includes job-category fixed effects and a two-day window.
26Appendix Table 3 presents these estimates for the most popular tests. The public revelation of test scores does not
significantly increase non-affiliates’ wage offers either overall or for workers disclosing scores above the 90th percentile of
the test score distribution. When point estimates are statistically different from zero for non-affiliates, they are negative.
Interactions for agency affiliates at or above the 90th percentile are positive for scores on technical tests, but they are not
significant. The signs of interactions for affiliation are mixed when considering non-technical tests. Although the results for
non-affiliates are small in magnitude and imprecisely estimated across specifications, one interpretation of negative point
estimates that is consistent with the information structure in the theoretical motivation is that non-affiliates may learn their
position in the distribution as a result of taking tests, inducing them to reduce their wage offers to capture the future return
from the increased likelihood of good feedback.
27For this calculation, the parameters βA and βN are estimated using the entire set of inexperienced non-affiliates’ and
affiliates’ job appplications. Because the set of switchers into affiliation may be non-random, the affiliation premium is
calculated using the characteristics for the switchers, X¯Switchers, against the non-affiliate baseline. This is the larger of the
possible estimates of the raw premium, making the portion of the premium due to the event study a conservative estimate.
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after the switch to agency affiliation, a demand shift is likely responsible for at least a part of the increase
in wages offered.
Job finding hazards are estimated for the subset of agency switchers and non-affiliates to assess the
extent to which demand shifts for switchers into agencies. Table 5 presents the results. Compared to non-
affiliates, agency switchers are estimated to find jobs with 35-percent fewer job applications after joining
agencies relative to the non-affiliate baseline in Cox proportional hazard models (Column 1), and 22-percent
fewer job applications in Weibull models (Column 3).28 Finally, because the modal switcher moves into
agency affiliation at the 15th job application, the job search behavior sample is restricted to those workers
with 15 applications or more prior to finding the first job or to censoring. The results remain similar.
Workers who switch into affiliation find work more quickly than do workers who remain non-affiliates,
suggesting that demand increases for workers when the agency brand appears along with their resume.
4.4 Subsequent Wages and Employment Probabilities are Most Responsive to Feed-
back for Non-affiliates
Affiliates’ increased probability of being hired, together with their higher wages on the first job, are
consistent with the model’s first set of equilibrium predictions. The second set of predictions are that the
wages of high-quality non-affiliates increase to the level of high-quality affiliates after on-the-job quality
revelation, while low-quality workers leave the market entirely.
Table 6 provides initial evidence that, for workers who remain in the market after the first job, the
ongoing agency affiliation earnings premium is much diminished. The first column presents the hourly wage
increases between the first and subsequent jobs for non-affiliates who are hired for at least two, at least
three, and at least four jobs, respectively. The second column presents the same information for affiliates.
Non-affiliates’ wages increase by an average of 14.7 percent between jobs one and two. For affiliates, the
hourly wage increases by an average of only 5.7 percent. Between jobs two and three, both non-affiliates
and affiliates see a positive change in their log hourly wage, but, for both groups, the growth is smaller
between jobs two and three than between jobs one and two. Non-affiliates experience wage growth of 12.7
percent while affiliates’ wages grow by 3.7 percent.
The penultimate row of Table 6 summarizes average hourly wage growth for non-affiliates and affiliates
between their first and fourth jobs for workers employed for at least four jobs in the data. The wages of
surviving non-affiliates grow by 33.3 percent overall, while affiliates’ wages grow by 13.6 percent between
28When including controls for the actual wage offer, results are even more extreme (Columns 2 and 4), but these specifications
that control for worker ”price” do not map directly into shifts in demand.
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the first and the fourth job.29 In general, the steeper wage gradient for non-affiliates suggests that there
is wage convergence. That wages grow but with declining increments is consistent with standard models
of Bayesian learning about workers (see Lange 2007). Larger wage growth for non-affiliates suggests that
employers may be updating their beliefs differentially about affiliates and non-affiliates. The remainder of
this section examines these career dynamics.
On average, around 68 percent of workers are re-hired after their first job. Whether there are differ-
ences in re-employment probabilities between affiliates and non-affiliates, as well as these probabilities’
responsiveness to good feedback, is estimated using the following linear model:
1 (SecondJobi) = α+ β1Affiliatei + β2GoodFeedbacki + β3Affiliatei ×GoodFeedbacki (3)
+β4NoFeedbacki + β5Affiliatei ×NoFeedbacki +Xiβ6 + αt + εi.
The sample is workers who land their first job between 8/1/2008 and 12/28/2009, and the dependent
variable is an indicator that a second job is observed prior to 8/14/2010. The results are shown in the
first four columns of Table 7. All specifications contain monthly time fixed effects, αt, so the estimates are
within entering cohort. The regression contains indicators for a good feedback score and for zero feedback,
with a baseline of bad feedback (a score less than or equal to 4.5). Thus, β2 is the marginal effect of a good
feedback score relative to a bad feedback score on the probability of re-hire for non-affiliates. For affiliates,
this marginal effect is β2 + β3, as the effect of feedback is allowed to differ for affiliates and non-affiliates
through the interaction term. The matrix Xi contains observable characteristics about workers and jobs.
Consistent with the equilibrium predictions of the model, the coefficient on the agency-affiliation indi-
cator is positive and significant, ranging from 0.056 to 0.081 depending on the specification and controls.
By the end of the first job, employers have information about the quality of all workers who have received
a feedback score. Having good feedback is positively and significantly associated with re-hire, overall and
in both technical and non-technical job categories. This is consistent with the equilibrium in the model
where revealed low-quality workers who receive bad feedback exit the market. For non-affiliates who re-
ceive a feedback score, good feedback increases the mean probability of finding a second job by 18 to 19
percentage points. For affiliates, the increase in the probability of re-hire associated with a good feedback
score is significantly smaller—around four or five percentage points below the estimate for non-affiliates.
This significant difference exists only for workers whose first jobs were in a technical job category. Column
29The relative wage growth trajectory for affiliates in technical jobs is much flatter than the relative growth for affiliates
in non-technical jobs. Affiliates in technical jobs see total wage growth between the first and fourth jobs of less than nine
percent. In contrast, affiliates in non-technical jobs see hourly wage growth between the first and fourth jobs of 22.5 percent.
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3 shows that the increase in the probability of re-hire associated with a good feedback score is six-percent
lower for affiliates in technical work. For non-technical workers, there is no significant difference in the
responsiveness to good feedback of the probability of re-hire for affiliates and non-affiliates.
The remaining columns of Table 7 examine the relationship between wages on subsequent jobs, feedback
scores and affiliation status. This analysis includes all workers in the original sample who were hired for
at least two jobs in the longer sample extending to 8/14/2010, resulting in nearly 55, 000 observations of
workers on distinct jobs. These last four columns of the table report results from the regression:
logWageit = αi + β1Experit + β2Experit ×Affiliatei + β3GoodFbit × Experit + (4)
β4Affiliatei ×GoodFbit × Experit + β5NoFbit × Experit + β6Affiliatei ×NoFbit × Experit
+β7JobNumberit + β8Affiliate× JobNumberit +Xitβ9 + εit.
Worker fixed effects, αi, capture differences in initial wages for workers with no feedback or experience.
The variable Experit is an indicator that the worker is experienced and eligible to have previous feedback.
The effect of experience is allowed to differ for affiliates and non-affiliates through the parameter β2.
The regression also contains indicators that experienced workers have good feedback (GoodFbit) or no
feedback (NoFbit), along with interactions for affiliation status. For experienced workers, the indicators
for good feedback or zero feedback capture differences from a baseline of a bad feedback score after gaining
experience. Gaining experience adds a one-time discrete shift in wages, while JobNumberit, the number
of previous hires, and an affiliate interaction, allow wages to evolve along different paths for affiliates and
non-affiliates. The matrix Xit contains fixed effects for job category and calendar time.
Similar to the results on selection into re-hiring, affiliates’ wages are less responsive than non-affiliates’
wages to a good feedback score. Column 6, the most general specification, shows that a good feedback
score is associated with an hourly wage increase of 10.4 percent for non-affiliates but of only 3.4 percent
for affiliates.30
These findings offer further evidence that employers’ expectations about worker quality change most
for non-affiliates with good feedback. This is consistent with the belief-updating process in the theoretical
framework that generates wage convergence. Having earned good feedback, a non-affiliate is able to be
re-hired and also receives a rapidly increasing hourly wage. For affiliates, a public signal that he or she
is high-quality is not associated with as large an increase in the probability of re-hire or with as large a
wage-feedback response. Good feedback on early jobs, thus, allows non-affiliates to catch up with affiliates.
30The 3.4-percent increase is the sum of the estimated coefficient for good feedback (0.104) and the estimated coefficient for
the interaction between good feedback and the affiliation indicator variable (−0.070).
24
To underscore this convergence, Table 8 presents summary statistics on wages and resume characteristics
for experienced non-U.S. oDesk workers who have had three or more previous jobs with at least one feedback
score at the time of measurement. The sample consists of 9, 489 unique non-affiliates and 2, 640 unique
affiliates.31 The first row of the table shows that the difference between the group average log hourly wages,
net of job category and time fixed effects, is much smaller than the difference for inexperienced workers.
The numbers in Columns 1 and 2 give the average deviation from the workers’ typical hourly wage in a
given job category and month for non-affiliates and affiliates, respectively. While the residual log hourly
rate is statistically different between the two groups, the magnitude of the gap is (−0.014 + 0.035), which,
at 0.041, is much smaller than the original gap of 0.231 for inexperienced workers estimated from Oaxaca-
Blinder decompositions in Column 4 of Table 3. It is also worth noting that the raw mean feedback score
for non-affiliates is slightly higher than the raw mean feedback score for affiliates. Over time, it appears
that, for the best non-affiliates, wages and feedback converge with those of affiliates.
4.5 Agency Dynamics
4.5.1 Agency Evolution and Survival
An implication of the agency role described in the model is that, in equilibrium, the agency benefits from
its ability to screen only if it can maintain its reputation. It does this by offering affiliation only to high-
quality screenable workers. It is possible that agency heads may be tempted to deviate from this strategy if
the supply of new, high quality, screenable workers declines or nears exhaustion. Table 9 assesses whether
affiliate quality changes with the size of the agency.
The results suggest that the quality of workers is very stable as agencies grow. The first three columns
of the table include the 1,126 agencies active during the time period spanned by the data, and the last
three columns include only the 872 agencies for which the complete agency history is observed. Panel A
presents the results of regressions of log hourly wages on measures of agency size. In Panel B, the dependent
variable is an indicator for a good feedback score (a score of at least 4.5 out of 5). The regressors of interest
are the number of workers previously hired under the agency brand and its square. Agency fixed effects
are included in all specifications, as are the detailed worker-level controls given in Appendix Table 1. The
estimated coefficients make it clear that the hourly wage and feedback score of the most recently affiliated
worker do not vary as an agency grows. The coefficients on agency size and the square of agency size
are very small relative to the mean, and are statistically insignificant. This is true both for technical jobs
31This analysis includes all workers who applied for their first job before August 1, 2008, not just the inexperienced workers
with job applications beginning after this date.
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(Columns 2 and 5) and non-technical jobs (Columns 3 and 6), and for the whole sample of agencies as well
as for the agencies whose entire histories are observed in the data.
Panel C in Table 9 examines how an agency evolves as a function of the feedback received for the
most recently affiliated agency member. The results in Panel C come from a Cox model in which failure
is defined as the most recently affiliated member being the last new agency affiliate observed in the data.
This variable is informative about whether or not an agency is growing. If no further new affiliates are
observed in the data, the agency is viewed as failing.32
The results suggest that an agency is significantly less likely to grow in size when the most recent
affiliate has received bad feedback, the baseline category. The hazard ratio of 0.831 in Column 1 on the
indicator for having received good feedback, is significantly less than one, indicating that an agency is less
likely to fail when the last affiliate receives good feedback. The coefficient on missing feedback is less than
one, but insignificantly so, revealing that the probability of agency failure after missing feedback is not
significantly different from the probability of agency failure after bad feedback. From Columns 2, 3, 5 and
6 of Table 9, recent bad or missing feedback significantly increases the likelihood of agency failure, but this
relationship is only present for agencies whose modal job category is technical rather than non-technical
work. In agencies specializing in non-technical work, a bad feedback score for the most recently affiliated
worker does not significantly affect the probability that an agency continues.
Overall, the results in Table 9 reveal that agencies are very stable; wages and feedback remain the same
as an agency gets larger. While it seems plausible that each agency faces an increasing incentive to affiliate
workers that are of lower-than-agency-average quality because the marginal affiliate’s impact on agency
reputation is decreasing in agency size, there is little evidence of this in the data. This motivates the
model’s equilibrium assumption that firm beliefs are such that observing a low-quality affiliate discredits
the relevant agency’s reputation entirely, and this assumption is particularly appropriate for technical
work.33
4.5.2 Attrition from agencies is rare
The probability of finding work after the first job is positively related to feedback. Do agencies retain
workers with good feedback? Table 10 establishes that very few workers remain on the site after having
32It is not possible to evaluate agency failure using the job prospects of existing experienced affiliates, as these workers have
public individual feedback scores and the agency plays a small role in their ongoing career prospects.
33These findings are similar to the insights about the dynamics of seller reputation in other online markets. For example,
Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) study the dynamics of seller reputation on eBay and show that buyers react to information about
a seller’s information and that seller’s actions reflect reputation considerations. Specifically, sellers are more likely to exit
after receiving bad feedback. Section 4 of Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) surveys the growing literature on the dynamics of
intermediary reputation.
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left an agency. The sample of workers included in this analysis is all agency affiliates who are hired at
least once. The vast majority of affiliates remain affiliated with the same agency for their entire oDesk
career. There are some workers leave agencies but continue on oDesk as non-affiliates, but this group is
small: only 2.5 percent of affiliates on the first job and only 1.5 percent of affiliates in technical jobs. Of
the small amount of attrition from agencies that does occur, the majority happens in non-technical jobs,
where 5.2 percent of affiliates work as a non-affiliate after have worked with an agency. In regressions
where the dependent variable is an indicator that the affiliate in question eventually leaves the agency, the
table reveals that affiliates who leave an agency are not observably different than affiliates who remain,
except for the possibility that those who leave earn slightly lower wages on the first job. However, this
result appears to be driven by heterogeneity across agencies and does not hold in specifications with agency
fixed effects. This offers some support for the model’s assumption that contracts adjust to keep even the
best workers affiliated with the agency over time.
5 Alternative Intermediation Functions and Discussion
5.1 Direct Benefits and Team Production
The results, so far, are consistent with the hypothesis that agencies provide information about inexperi-
enced worker quality. This section asks if there is also evidence of an intermediation role that increases
worker productivity directly (Autor, 2001a). For example, agencies could be providing translation services
for workers with poor English language skills or training for less-educated or less-skilled workers. The
maintained assumption here is that agencies provide a uniform signal of quality for all affiliates, or no sig-
nal of quality for all affiliates. In this case, under the hypothesized alternative role of direct agency benefits
to productivity, agency affiliation might be expected to have a heterogeneous effect among workers with
differing skills. For example, if agencies benefit workers with poor language skills, then the relationship
between productivity measures or wages and the good English skills dummy is expected to be less pro-
nounced for affiliates relative to non-affiliates. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder regressions, if agencies benefit
workers with poor English skills, (βˆGoodEnglishSkillsA − βˆGoodEnglishSkillsN ), is predicted to be negative.
If there is no evidence of heterogeneous effects, then agencies may not be providing direct productive
benefits. The results in Table 11 show that agency job-finding, wage, and productivity advantages are
indeed relatively uniform across workers with different observable characteristics. Estimated coefficients
and robust standard errors from a pooled version of the Oaxaca-Blinder models are reported. In the pooled
model, non-affiliates serve as the baseline, with coefficient estimates reported in the first of each successive
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pair of columns. Every covariate entering the model also has an affiliate interaction, reported in the second
of each pair of columns. The relevant test is whether the affiliation interaction differs from the non-affiliate
baseline. The first four covariates are of interest for assessing whether agency effects are heterogeneous
across affiliates.
The results for wages, shown in Columns 5 and 6, are most interesting. For workers with a bachelor’s or
higher degree, the estimated interaction term for affiliation is small, positive, and statistically insignificant
in the model for log wages. While non-affiliates appear less likely to report having a bachelor’s or higher
degree, the wage premium for educated workers relative to less-educated workers does not differ under
agency affiliation.
Given that the workers in the sample are located outside of the United States, heterogeneity in the
agency effect on wages for employed workers with varying English skills may be likely. However, this is not
the case. In the log wage model, the agency interaction is negative, and the standard error is larger than
the point estimate. The agency interaction is not significantly different from the baseline for non-affiliates
in any specification. While non-affiliates report having good English skills more frequently, the difference
between the group means is small (87 percent compared to 79 percent, as shown in Table 2, Columns 3
and 4). Overall, it does not appear that agencies provide a benefit based on translation or other language
services.
These results, combined with the remaining estimates corresponding to years of prior experience and
an indicator for having taken skills tests, lead to the conclusion that the magnitude of the agency wage
premium is unrelated to affiliates’ skill levels. It is not possible to detect the provision of direct benefits that
increase affiliates’ on-the-job productivity. This casts doubt on the alternative hypothesis that affiliation
directly causes workers to be more productive.
For several other dependent variables related to first jobs—notably, days of job search and number of
applications prior to initial hire— the affiliate interaction suggests that the agency premium is, if anything,
greater for affiliates with higher levels of observable skills. Relative to affiliates with poor English skills,
those with good English skills have shorter searches and make fewer applications prior to initial hire,
relative to the difference that English skills makes in these outcomes for non-affiliates. In general, there
are no heterogeneous agency interactions that suggest that affiliation has a particularly large effect on the
outcomes of relatively less skilled affiliates.34,35
34The regressions in Table 11 also include detailed interactions for individual categories of tests and test scores. No
interactions are statistically different from zero for detailed test score measures when the log wage, days of job search, number
of job applications prior to employment, or the length of the first job is the dependent variable. Interactions for database
administration are statistically significant when success or feedback scores are the dependent variable, but no other test score
interactions are statistically different from zero in these specifications.
35If the signaling value of affiliation is complementary with workers’ skills, rather than uniform across all affiliates, then this
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An additional potential agency role is the potential that they facilitate hiring groups of workers.
Whether a worker is on a team-based job is a job characteristic that can be included as an observable
characteristic in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, revealing whether variation in teamwork affects wages,
job finding probabilities, and project outcomes. A team-based job is defined as one in which the worker
is hired by an employer who has also hired another oDesk worker within a seven-day window around the
worker’s application date. Around 60 percent of the jobs on oDesk are classified as team-based jobs. An
agency-team-based job is defined as one in which an employer hires more than one agency affiliate within
a seven-day window. Around one third of affiliates’ first jobs involve agency teams.36,37
An additional consideration is whether the ability to form teams of agency affiliates has any additional
positive effect for agency affiliates. Lyons (2014) finds that homogeneous teams achieve better outcomes in
an experiment in the oDesk setting, and affiliates of the same agency tend to be relatively homogeneous—
sharing many observable characteristics. It is therefore possible that agencies facilitate team production.
Around 22 percent of the affiliate sample involves workers on team-based jobs without another team
member from the same agency.
Nonetheless, these patterns in team organization provide enough variation to identify the effect of
agency teams separately from individual workers’ participation on general team-based projects. The sixth
row of coefficients in Table 11 shows that there is some evidence for an agency-team effect. Wages for
affiliates on agency teams are higher by 11.4 percent; job-finding speeds increase; projects last longer;
and feedback is superior for agency-team-based projects. The estimates suggest that agency affiliates are
generally better at working on teams than non-affiliates, and working with members of the same agency
appears to generate advantages.
From the detailed estimates, it is possible to decompose the estimated agency premium from Table 3
into two portions: one due to agency-team production; and a residual portion that is orthogonal to the
agency-team estimate by including additional controls in the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions. This is done
by treating teamwork and agency teamwork as part of the ”explained” component of the wage/outcome
gap due to agency affiliation. The bottom two rows of Table 11 present the results of decompositions
that include both an indicator for being employed on a team job, and an indicator for being employed on
exercise is more problematic. In this case, it is possible that workers with low skills receive the additional production benefit
from affiliation and workers with high skills receive the complementary signaling benefit. The net result would be a bias
toward finding a common agency effect. Agencies prevalence in technical jobs does not provide evidence for complementarity,
as all specifications contain job category fixed effects.
36These measures may overstate the incidence of team production for workers because there is no guarantee that workers
who are hired jointly in a short time span actually perform work together.
37When splitting the sample into technical and non-technical jobs, 51.4 percent of non-affiliates’ technical jobs are classified
as team-based jobs, 51.2 percent of affiliates’ technical jobs are team-based, and 33.1 percent of affiliates’ technical jobs are
agency-team based jobs. In non-technical categories, 71.8 percent of non-affiliates’ jobs are team-based, while 68.2 percent of
affiliates’ jobs are team-based and 32.8 percent of affiliates’ jobs are agency-team based.
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a team with members of the same agency. The row labeled ”Agency Premium Accounting For Teams”
includes decomposition results that treat
(
βTeamA − βTeamN
)
X¯TeamA and
(
βAgency−TeamA − 0
)
X¯Agency−TeamA
as part of the agency premium. In contrast, the row labeled ”Premium Removing Agency Teams” removes
βAgency−TeamA X¯
Agency−Team
A and
(
βTeamA − βTeamN
)
X¯TeamA from the calculation of the agency premium.
With this latter calculation, the reported agency premium after removing differences in agency team
production assumes that the removal of agency teams would result in individual work. These assumptions
lead to larger estimates of the effect of team production (and smaller estimates of the agency premium)
relative to assumptions that agency affiliates would form teams with other workers.
Overall, the results are mixed, but a significant premium for job-finding probabilities, wages, hours
worked, and success still exists after any team composition effect from the agency premium. Affiliates
working individually find jobs about 11 to 13 percent faster than non-affiliates, earn wages that are about
15 percent higher, work on projects that involve 30 percent more hours; and have success reported about
6 percent more frequently. However, agency teamwork explains most of the observed feedback advantage
between affiliates and non-affiliates, so there is some evidence that team production may enhance agency
affiliates’ output quality.
Whether the advantages of team production are causal requires an analysis over workers’ careers.
Adding measures of team production to the models in equations (3) and (4), agency teamwork is found to
have little influence in explaining the documented variation over the careers of affiliates and non-affiliates.
Columns 1 through 4 in Table 12 revisit the analysis in Table 7, allowing for differences in teamwork
and in agency-based teamwork. The sample is workers on their first job, and the dependent variable is
an indicator that a worker finds a second job. The point estimates on the agency-affiliate indicator in
each of the first four columns is positive and significant, and the estimates are similar in magnitude to
the estimates that did not account for team production (Table 7, Columns 1 to 4). It is important to
note that, when detailed controls are included, the parameter estimates on the feedback measures and the
affiliate-feedback interactions are also similar to the estimates given in Table 7. The finding that affiliates’
re-employment probability is less reponsive to feedback than the equivalent probability for non-affiliates
remains particularly strong in technical work. Affiliates on technical agency teams are slightly more likely
to find subsequent jobs, but the main effect of agency affiliation is around six times larger than the effect
of agency-team production.
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 12 revisit the panel analysis of wages over workers’ careers presented in Columns
5 to 8 of Table 7. These specifications all include worker fixed effects, allowing for the identification of
the effect of various measures of teamwork using only variation within worker. The estimates in Column 6
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indicate that being on a team-based job is associated with lower wages for non-affiliates, but the effect is
mitigated for affiliates working in teams. In addition, there is no positive effect on wages for affiliates who
work on affiliate teams. All other estimates are very similar to the comparable specifications in Columns 5
to 8 of Table 7, including those in which the effect of teamwork is allowed to vary over time. In addition, the
estimates of the effect of feedback are nearly identical when allowing for differential trends by team-based
job status, suggesting that compositional changes in team production over workers’ careers are unlikely to
explain the documented convergence in wages between affiliates and non-affiliates.
5.2 Implications for Online Labor Market Organization
How much do intermediaries matter? A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the total gain
from agencies’ presence in this market is substantial. Thirty-two percent of the inexperienced workers
who find work are affiliates. Assuming that, in the absence of agencies, affiliates would be unable to
communicate their superior, unobserved quality to employers, the employment outcomes for non-affiliates
serve as a baseline for how the market would operate in the absence of agencies. An adjustment is
required, however, because Table 2 suggests that a portion of the earnings difference is due to agency
affiliates having differentially valued observable characteristics. Thus, average earnings per worker in the
absence of affiliation are estimated as: EarningsNSN + (EarningsN + ∆EarningsA,N × (1− 0.50))SA,
where Earningsi is the mean earnings for group i = N (for non-affiliates) or A (for affiliates); Si is the
share of each group; ∆EarningsA,N is the earnings gap between affiliates and non-affiliates; and (1− 0.50)
is the portion of the gap attributable to differences in characteristics (not due to agency affiliation).
Using this number offers an estimate of revenues per worker in the absence of intermediaries in the
market because it assumes that employers will select workers who resemble affiliates, based on their observed
characteristics, at the same rate that affiliates currently land the first job. Thus, the calculation ignores
the extensive margin where agency affiliation helps workers to land the first job, while assuming that the
same number of hires are made.38 Taking the difference between the actual per-worker transaction volume
and this calculation suggests that, in the absence of agencies, average earnings per worker would have
been about $3, 779, compared to $4, 211 in the presence of agencies. Therefore, under these assumptions,
agencies increase allocative efficiency by about 11.4 percent.
The finding that inexperienced affiliates are, on average, higher-quality workers than inexperienced
38It is likely that the equilibrium number of hires is also larger when agencies provide information about worker quality.
For simplicity, the model in Section 3 assumes that all firms make hires with and without the agency. Pallais (2014) allows
for information to affect the extensive margin of the number of hires. Using experimental data, she finds that the number of
hires increases with information about worker quality.
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affiliates raises the question of how agencies screen for quality and why all workers don’t join agencies. The
answer is likely to be that the boundaries of existing social networks limit the size of any single agency.
Affiliates of the same agency are frequently located in the same city and have similar skills, often having
attended classes together at the same educational institutions and, in general, are very likely to know each
other personally. This suggests that agencies are able to screen worker quality and offer affiliation only to
high-quality workers by using the shared oﬄine social ties that pre-date workers’ oDesk registration. It is
also possible that the high-quality workers who start agencies tend to be acquainted only with other high-
quality potential workers. In either case, the type of social ties that are known to play a role in traditional
labor markets, such as referral systems through ”Old Boy Networks” (Saloner, 1985), appear to facilitate
screening in this setting.39 Agencies are performing a role that is similar to that played by the experts
described in Biglaiser (1993), the certification intermediaries in Lizzeri (1999) and the temporary help
supply firms discussed in Autor (2001b), but without requiring either any costly additional screening or
self-selection, as in Spence (1973). In this way, rather than being rendered obsolete by recent developments
in communication technology, oﬄine social ties complement online interactions.40
5.3 General implications for labor and product markets
oDesk presents an unusually detailed setting for studying the question of market responses to incomplete
information because the information that employers have about workers in this market is comparable to
that available to researchers. In many relevant ways, the oDesk market resembles other spot markets for
labor, such as the general model described in Tervio (2009), where employment of inexperienced workers,
who lack verified performance data, is likely to be inefficiently low (Pallais, 2014). Many subsets of labor
markets do have public revelation of ability from experience: Actors make films that are public outputs;
graphic and web designers produce portfolios of work that are shared with clients; fund managers have
documented performance histories through reporting returns; academics publish papers and have public
records of citation counts; chefs have ratings from food critics, etc.
The agency role within the oDesk market raises the question of whether other mechanisms and orga-
nizations that reduce incomplete information will arise endogenously within spot labor markets. Agencies
39Montgomery (1991) describes how referrals from current employees connected to a social network lead to subsequent hiring
from the same network. Casella and Hanaki (2006, 2008) show how costly signaling of worker quality can substitute for finding
employment through a personal connection. Burks et al. (2013) provide estimates of the productivity effects of referrals.
40Several recent related papers study the role of social networks in providing information about online investment quality.
Agrawal et al. (2011) suggest that investors sharing personal connections to unsigned music artists are less responsive to others’
investment decisions because they have informational advantages about the artist’s quality. In their study of the loan market
Prosper.com, Freedman and Jin (2010) find that borrower affiliation with a social network is not associated with borrower
quality. They propose that this is due to characteristics of the market design, which limit incentives for group founders to
grant membership only to good-quality borrowers.
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on oDesk are particularly prevalent where information about worker quality is most incomplete, consistent
with the hypothesis that they are an endogenous response to this source of market failure. For example,
a larger share of workers are affiliated with agencies in countries where the educational institutions are
most likely to be unfamiliar to potential employers, of whom the majority are US-based. Affiliation is also
relatively prevalent in job categories where worker and, hence, work quality is hardest to assess before and
even during the job; that is, in technical rather than non-technical tasks. Other studies of online labor
markets discuss different methods by which information can be credibly shared.41
There is a growing empirical literature on incomplete information in product markets that identifies
how buyers and sellers respond to credible information about product quality. In some cases, institutional
features of the market allow sellers to provide information. For example, Lewis (2011) examines the role
of voluntary information disclosure in defining explicit contracts between buyers and sellers regarding the
quality of used cars sold on eBay Motors. In other cases, the feedback provided by other buyers conveys
quality information: Resnick and Zeckhauser (2002) and Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) discuss the economics
of internet auctions and summarize the empirical evidence on the relationship between the information
contained in seller feedback and price. Jin and Kato (2006) present evidence that feedback can be a credible
signal that sellers offer good quality. Luca (2010) shows that restaurant revenues respond more strongly
to online restaurant reviews for unbranded restaurants without a national reputation. In general, these
papers do not investigate buyers’ incentives to leave feedback, or the problem faced by inexperienced sellers
with no existing feedback, which is the main question addressed here.
Relatively few empirical papers demonstrate how third parties provide quality-related information, but
Sufi (2009) and Tang (1999) show that, in the market for financial services, third-party rating agencies
impact firm’s access to bank loans, which has real effects on firms’ investment policies. As is the case
for intermediaries on oDesk, these effects are larger when other information about loan quality is limited.
The contribution of this paper to the broader literature is to highlight the institutional features that have
proven to be sufficient for third-party organizations to emerge to provide information: In oDesk, agencies
appear able to screen inexperienced worker quality without incuring additional costs, but the key features
that allow them to extract surplus from doing so are the publicly-revealed agency-level feedback together
with the long-term contracting arrangement that is possible between agencies and workers, but not between
workers and employers.
41See Horton (2010) for a discussion of the features of online labor markets. Bagues and Labini (2009) show how mandatory
disclosure of quality-relevant worker information affects worker outcomes, such as unemployment duration, wages, and job
satisfaction.
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6 Conclusion
This paper presents evidence that intermediary organizations called outsourcing agencies have arisen within
online labor markets to provide information about worker quality that is valuable to employers. Affiliation
with one of the many small independent outsourcing agencies on oDesk.com is strongly positively correlated
with success on the site—affiliates’ lifetime earnings are around three and a half times higher than the
earnings of non-affiliates who have similar observable skills and characteristics. The results reveal that the
source of this advantage is that agencies credibly signal that inexperienced agency affiliates are relatively
high quality, reducing information frictions in the market. Agencies protect their own reputations by
continuing to affiliate only high quality workers.
This agency-affiliation premium is consistent with an information-provision role because it originates
during the early stages of workers’ careers, when information about worker quality is particularly incom-
plete. In addition, agency affiliation is concentrated in settings where information is likely to be most
valuable: in technical jobs and for workers in overseas countries where it is hardest for potential employers
to verify worker quality from observable charateristics. Among experienced workers, there is little-to-no
ongoing agency-affiliation premium. Good feedback received by workers on their early jobs appears to sub-
stitute for the information contained in agency affiliation. Non-affiliates’ likelihood of being re-employed,
and their subsequent hourly wages, are more responsive to the feedback scores received on the job than for
affiliates, implying that more information is contained in good feedback scores for non-affiliated workers.
An important implication of the findings is that agencies have a large positive impact on the volume of
trade by increasing the number of high-quality workers in the market. By demonstrating how intermediaries
have arisen to perform this information-provision role, the findings suggest that organizations that overcome
incomplete information frictions can have a large effect on the allocative efficiency of labor-offshoring
markets, despite the large amount of digital information that is available to trading partners.
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Appendix 1: Proofs
The model presented in Section 3 describes two perfect Bayesian equilibria: first, an equilibrium in the case
of no agency and, second, an equlibrium in the case where the agency can screen a share of new workers.
This appendix offers a proof that the second proposed equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The
proof for the first equilibrium follows as a special case by setting the share of screenable workers, a, to
zero.42
We focus on conditions that guarantee some workers without agency affiliation are hired; this allows a
contrast between workers’ careers under affiliation and non-affiliation. The condition is that the number
of job openings, N, is larger than the number of known high quality workers and the number of agency
affiliates. We also posit that the number of openings is smaller than the number of new workers plus the
number of high quality workers and agency affiliates (who are high quality in equilibrium).
After applying a law of large numbers, let EHA denote the (non-stochastic) number of revealed high
quality workers and agency affiliates in the market. With probability h, each of the E new workers who
enter the market is high quality. Given that all agency affiliates and revealed high quality workers are hired
in equilibrium, N −EHA non-affiliates with unknown types are hired. This gives the steady-state condition
EHA = h(N − EHA) + 2ahE where h(N − EHA) is the number of high types after revelation of ability
on the job and 2ahE is the number of agency affiliates. This yields EHA =
h
1+h(N + 2aE). The condition
EHA < N < EHA + (1− a)E corresponds to the case considered.
Strategies: We first formally define each player’s equilibrium strategy and beliefs, and then we show
that there is no profitable deviation for any player. Given the market clearing process outlined in the main
text, a strategy for the firm is a function that maps observable worker characteristics and wage offers to
a hiring ranking. Subscripts are used to denote a particular value specific to workers of type each type
along 3 dimensions, ijt. When used for the firm’s strategies, these subscripts denote how a particular type
of worker is distinguished in the firm’s ranking. When used for a worker’s wage offer strategy, it denotes a
strategy conditional on the information that has been revealed.
Let i be the worker’s agency affiliation, i ∈ {A,N}, revealed type from past work, j ∈ {H,L,U} (where
U indicates the worker’s type has not been revealed), and t ∈ {1, 2} indicating the period of the worker’s
42It is certainly possible to construct other equilibria of the model. For example, there is another equilibrium in which
all market participants believe the agency only affiliates high quality workers in even periods. In odd periods, new affiliates
are random. The equilibrium described in the text is one reasonable equilibrium among the set of equilibria that maximize
allocative efficiency. The differences in wage and career dynamics between affiliates and non-affiliates are robust among the
set of constrained efficient equilibria. .
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life. The equilibrium strategy for each firm is then a ranking function:
max (Xijt − wijt for all ijt, 0)
where, without loss because of the discrete nature of types, each Xijt is a type-specific constant that the
firm submits for each observable type of worker and wijt is the wage offer submitted by the worker. The
zero allows the firm the option to not hire. All firms equilibrium rankings set XAH2 = XAU1 = XAU2 =
XNH2 = H (note XAH1, XAL1, XNH1, XNL1 are not possible, as a worker in the first period does not have
a type revealed from work experience). Further, XAL2 = XNL2 = L, and XNU1 = XNU2 = hH+(1− h)L.
The market clearing authority then evaluates these rankings and uses the relevant constants Xijt less the
wage offered for each worker to evaluate which worker a randomly drawn firm prefers to hire. This continues
until no firms remain.
A strategy for each worker is a mapping from type and the history of play to a wage offer in each period
and a mapping from the history of play and an agency contract-offer to an affiliation acceptance decision
(accept affiliation or reject). For all workers, equilibrium wage offers are
wA = wNH2 = w
H :=
(1− h)
(1 + h)
(H − L)
wAL2 = wNL2 = wNU2 = 0
wNU1 = −h(1− h)
(1 + h)
(H − L) = wU := −hwH .
Here wA is used for shorthand for the wage of all agency affiliates, as wAU1 = wAH2 = wAU2.
43 If no
past agency affiliate has been revealed to be a low type, each worker’s affiliation strategy is to accept the
contract at t = 1 iff β1 + β2 ≤ (1 + h)wH . For workers at t = 2 and j = H or L, affiliation is accepted iff
β2 ≤ 0. For workers at t = 2 and j = U, affiliation is accepted iff β2 ≤ wH .
The agency’s strategy is a mapping from the history of play, a worker’s screenability, s, a worker’s type,
θ, and the period in a worker’s life t to a contract offer (β1, β2) for workers at t = 1 and β2 for workers at
t = 2 that stipulates a lump-sum payment to the agency at the beginning of the period. For workers who
have s = 1, θ is known by the agency even when they have no past work experience. For workers who have
s = 0, θ is unknown by the agency unless the worker has past experience.
43Note that wages with superscriptes denote equilibrium wages, that may be earned by several types of workers. Wages
with subscripts (ijt) denote the wages paid to a worker of type (ijt).
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The agency’s contract strategy is:
(β1, β2) =
(
(1 + h)wH , 0
)
for workers with θ = H, s = 1, t = 1
(β1, β2) = (Υ, 0) for workers with θ = L, s = 1, t = 1
(β1, β2) = ((1− h) Υ, 0) for workers with θ = U, s = 0, t = 1
β2 = 0 for workers with θ = H, s ∈ {0, 1} , t = 2
β2 = Υ for workers with θ = L, s ∈ {0, 1} , t = 2
β2 = (1− h) Υ for workers with θ = U, s ∈ {0, 1} , t = 2
where Υ is the present discounted value of agency revenues from following the equilibrium strategy and
ever allowing a low quality worker into the agency.
Beliefs: On the equilibrium path, agency affiliates are always revealed to be high quality after being
hired. If, over the history of past play, there has never been an agency affiliate that is a revealed low quality
worker on the job, all players believe that inexperienced agency affiliates are high quality with probability
1. Off the equilibrium, if there is ever a low quality worker observed as an agency affiliate, all players
believe that inexperienced agency affiliates are high types with probability h. Beliefs about experienced
workers equal the type that is revealed through the job. All of these beliefs are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
There are no profitable deviations: Given these strategies and beliefs for workers and firms, firms are
indifferent between matching with a known high-quality worker at t = 2, an affiliate at t = 1, an affiliate
at t = 2, or an inexperienced non-affiliate at t = 1. If the firm is matched with a high quality worker or
an affiliate, the firm earns H − wH = 2hH+(1−h)L(1+h) > 0. If matched with an inexperienced non-affiliate of
unknown type at t = 1, the firm earns hH + (1− h)L+ hwH = 2hH+(1−h)L(1+h) > 0. If matched with a known
L type worker, the firm gets L. If matched with an unknown and inexperienced worker, the firm gets
hH + (1− h)L. It is clear that the firm prefers to be matched with an unknown type at t = 2 relative to
a revealed L type.
All firms prefer matching with affiliates, known high types, or inexperienced unknown workers at t = 1
to matching with unknown types at t = 2 because 2hH+(1−h)L(1+h) > hH + (1− h)L. This also implies that
the firm prefers the matches as a result of the equilibrium to matching with a low type. By the previous
inequality, any deviation that weakly increases the probability of matching with any other type of worker
makes the firm worse off and weakly reduces the firm’s payoffs: the firm does not set wages or realized
output, and the ranking only influences the allocation of matches. Each firm can do no better than the
equilibrium matches given workers’ wage offers. In fact, the equilibrium rankings are simply the firm’s
41
profit function, and maximize profits by definition.
Now consider potential deviations by workers. If an affiliate or a known high quality worker submits
a wage higher than wH , matching occurs with probability 0 and payoffs fall from wH to 0. Because the
agency fee is collected before matching occurs, affiliates cannot avoid the fee by submitting a wage that
results in no match. Alternatively, a deviation to a wage lower than wH does not change the probability
of matching, but results in payoffs lower than wH . Non-affiliates at t = 1 are exactly indifferent between
their wage offer and foregoing employment by raising their wage offer. This is because wNU1 comes from
the lifetime zero-profit condition for non-affiliates. Any increase in the wage offer results in never being
hired. A reduction in wages below wNU1 results in employment with probability 1, but expected lifetime
earnings are negative with a wage cut.
Workers’ decisions to accept affiliation are also optimal. All workers with s = 0 or s = 1 and θ =
L turn down the agency contract. The agency demands more fees than the lifetime earnings for these
workers, resulting in negative lifetime payoffs relative to remaining unaffiliated. Workers offered the agency
contract (β1, β2) = (1 + h, 0) infer that they are high quality and accept the contract. This contract
makes the worker exactly indifferent between affiliation and working as a non-affiliate with wage offers(
wNU1 = −hwH − ε, wNH2 = wH
)
.
Lifetime earnings for the worker under non-affiliation are (1− h)wH . Total wages for the worker under
affiliation are 2wH , and the agency collects (1 + h)wH , such that worker receives 2wH − (1 + h)wH , which
equals the payment under non-affiliation. The agency has no incentive to deviate from this strategy by
construction. The equilibrium contract makes the agency indifferent between continuing on and collecting
payments from the future stream of affiliates and allowing a non-affiliate into the agency. However, no non-
affiliate will be willing to pay the future stream of discounted payments to the agency under reasonable
discount rates. In addition, the contract for screenable high quality workers is optimal, as any other contract
either results in the worker no selecting affiliation or leaves money on the table.
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Figure 1
A sample worker profile. The individual feedback score is in the top right corner, and the agency name
appears as ”qCode”, along with the agency-level feedback score. The work history on recent jobs is visible
in the middle of the screen.
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Figure 2: The Share of Affiliates and Non-Affiliates employed at least once by the number of applications made prior to first hire.
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Job Application Number 
Affiliates
Non-Affiliates
Mean Std Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Complete agency history is observed (Agencies established after 8/1/2008) 0.77 0.42 0 1
Number of unique workers hired in the data while under agency identifier 3.25 5.49 1 76
Number of inexperienced workers first hired in the data while under agency identifier 2.87 5.03 1 65
Modal worker country for the agency is:
The U.S. 0.01 0.09 0.00 1
India or Pakistan 0.52 0.50 0.00 1
Russia or Ukraine 0.11 0.32 0.00 1
The Philippines 0.14 0.35 0.00 1
Share of hires from the agency's modal country 0.98 0.11 0.32 1
Share of hires in modal technical or non-technical classification 0.84 0.28 0.50 1
Modal job is technical 0.69 0.46 0.00 1
Number of agencies 1126
Notes:  The sample involves outsourcing agencies with a newly hired worker between 8/1/2008 and 12/28/2009. Some agencies exist prior to this time. 
Agencies that do not have new affiliates during the sample period are excluded from these calculations. In later analysis that focuses on agencies over time, 
an extended sample is used. Technical jobs are those listed under Web Development, Software Development, Networking and Info Systems, 3D Modeling 
and CAD, Engineering and Technical Design, or Search Engine Optimization. Non-technical jobs are those listed under Administrative Support, Business 
Services, Customer Services, Sales and Marketing, and Writing and Translation. Some agencies have zero recorded hours of work; this is because some 
projects are initiated towards the end of the sample, but billing begins only after the sample period ends. For ongoing projects, total hours are recorded as of 
the end of the sample.
Table 1: Summary Statistics with Outsourcing Agencies as the Unit of Analysis.
Table 2: Summary Statistics with Workers as the Unit of Analysis.
All Applicants for Hourly 
Jobs Workers Hired Once or More
Workers Hired Twice or 
More
Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of workers with first applications between 8/1/2008 and 
12/28/2009, including workers in the U.S.
112,943 12,276 9,376 3,390 6,319 2,524
Number of these workers outside the U.S. (main sample) 72,278 10,751 6,872 3,231 4,611 2,253
Share of Affiliates and of Non-Affiliates in: 
India/Pakistan 0.27 0.54 0.02 0.55 0.25 0.55
Russia/Ukraine 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.12
The Philippines 0.35 0.11 0.38 0.11 0.40 0.11
Technical Jobs 0.34 0.68 0.38 0.73 0.37 0.72
Non-Technical Jobs 0.66 0.32 0.62 0.27 0.63 0.28
Mean Characteristics by Group:
Log Hourly Wage on First Job (First Application in Columns 1-2) 1.94 2.15 1.37 2.03 1.29 1.99
Bachelors Degree or Higher, Indicator 0.25 0.30 0.42 0.33 0.45 0.35
Good English Skills, Indicator 0.54 0.78 0.87 0.79 0.92 0.85
Skills Tests Taken, Indicator 0.39 0.37 0.72 0.50 0.78 0.55
Years of Prior Experience 5.33 3.94 5.48 4.08 5.42 4.08
Mean Career Earnings Through 8/14/2010 [a], $ 387 1,787 3,348 6,045 3,700 5,850
Earnings Gap Due to Affiliation from Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 70% 50% 44.2%
Affiliation Earnings Premium Over Average Non-Affiliate Earnings 251.4% 40.4% 25.7%
[a]  Total Earnings for workers in Columns 5 and 6 are calculated for jobs after the first job.
Notes: The sample consists of workers with first job application dates on oDesk between 8/1/2008 and 12/28/2009. The sample in Columns 1 and 2 is oDesk workers on their first hourly-paying job 
application, while Columns 3-6 restrict the sample to those workers who are hired for at least one, or at least two, hourly jobs. The proportion of affiliates and non-affiliates joining oDesk over time is 
relatively constant during the sample period. For the calculations in Columns 1 and 2, workers are assigned to affiliation status as-of their first application. For the calculations in Columns 3-6, 
workers are assigned to agency affiliation status based on whether they are affiliated as of their first hourly-paying job, regardless of whether workers switch into agency affiliation between the first 
job application and the first employment spell. Prior to finding a first job, there are 1,433 workers who first apply for jobs as non-affiliates and then switch into agency affiliation. Of these, 408 find 
jobs. There are 101 workers who begin as affiliates and then switch to non-affiliation. Of these, 15 find jobs. There are 106 workers who begin as non-affiliates, switch into affiliation, and then switch 
back out of affiliation. Of these, 22 find jobs. Two-sample t-tests with unequal variances all reject equality of the means between non-affiliates and affiliates at the 1% level. The Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition includes monthly time fixed effects, job category fixed effects, the worker's pre-odesk years of experience, scores on oDesk skills tests as detailed in Appendix Table 1, revenue from 
fixed-price contracts before the first hourly job, the number of hires on fixed-price jobs, and dummy variables for worker education levels, English skills, programming experience, and country. The 
agency affiliation premium is defined as the mean percentage increase or decrease in an outcome for agency affiliates relative to non-affiliates net of differences explained by observable 
characteristics.
Table 3:  Estimates of Affiliate Job-Finding Probability, Wage, and Productivity Differences on the First Job
Dependent Variable:
Indicator for 
Being Hired At 
Least Once
Log 1 + Elapsed 
Days of Job 
Search
Log Applications 
Prior to Initial 
Hire
Log Hourly 
Wage
Log 1 + Hours 
Worked
Success 
Reported by 
Employer
Good Feedback 
(Greater than 
4.5)
Good Feedback 
(Given 
Feedback 
Provided)
Sample: Job Applicants Workers on First Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Summary Data:
  Number of Affiliates 10,751 3,231 3,231 3,231 3,231 2,822 2,822 2,424
  Number of Non-Affiliates 72,278 6,872 6,872 6,872 6,872 6,046 6,046 5,144
  Mean of Dependent Variable: Affiliates 0.27 1.97 1.61 2.03 3.74 0.62 0.59 0.69
  Mean of Dependent Variable: Non-Affiliates 0.10 2.46 2.12 1.37 3.15 0.58 0.58 0.68
  Mean Difference Between Affiliates and Non-Affiliates 0.17 -0.48 -0.51 0.66 0.59 0.04 0.01 0.01
Estimates:
  Oaxaca-Blinder Estimate of Gap % Due to Affiliation 72.4% 49.1% 37.6% 34.9% 57.0% 135.0% 12.2% 265.5%
  Entropy Balancing Estimate of Affiliation Effect 0.114 -0.202 -0.172 0.193 0.288 0.068 0.006 0.027
(0.005) (0.055) -0.0450 (0.024) (0.052) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
  Entropy Balancing Estimate of Constant 0.152 2.175 1.779 1.836 3.448 0.554 0.584 0.660
  Agency Affiliation Premium from OB Decomposition 120.9% -23.8% -19.3% 23.1% 33.6% 10.0% 0.2% 2.7%
  Agency Affiliation Premium from Re-weighting 75.0% -20.2% -17.2% 19.3% 28.8% 12.2% 1.1% 4.1%
Summary Data:
  Number of Affiliates 7,259 2,359 2,359 2,359 2,359 2,035 2,035 1,734
  Number of Non-Affiliates 24,561 2,606 2,606 2,606 2,606 2,254 2,254 1,988
  Mean of Dependent Variable: Affiliates 0.29 1.82 1.42 2.34 3.91 0.64 0.60 0.71
  Mean of Dependent Variable: Non-Affiliates 0.11 2.41 1.86 2.09 3.37 0.60 0.62 0.70
  Mean Difference Between Affiliates and Non-Affiliates 0.19 -0.59 -0.44 0.25 0.54 0.04 -0.02 0.01
Estimates:
  Oaxaca-Blinder Estimate of % Due to Agency Affiliation 70.4% 47.2% 52.1% 73.0% 62.2% 196.9% -15.1% 430.1%
  Entropy Balancing Estimate of Affiliation Effect 0.124 -0.241 -0.200 0.173 0.305 0.086 0.005 0.041
(0.007) (0.073) (0.057) (0.024) (0.067) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
  Entropy Balancing Estimate of Constant 0.171 2.063 1.624 2.168 3.606 0.555 0.597 0.665
  Agency Affiliation Premium from OB Decomposition 123.0% -27.6% -22.9% 18.3% 33.8% 13.8% 0.4% 4.3%
  Agency Affiliation Premium from Re-weighting 72.5% -24.1% -20.0% 17.3% 30.5% 15.5% 0.8% 6.1%
Panel A:  All Job Categories
Panel B: Workers with Initial Applications or Jobs in Technical Job Categories
Table 3, Contd.:  Estimates of Affiliate Job-Finding Probability, Wage, and Productivity Differences on the First Job.
Dependent Variable:
Indicator for 
Being Hired At 
Least Once
Log 1 + Elapsed 
Days of Job 
Search
Log Applications 
Prior to Initial 
Hire
Log Hourly 
Wage
Log 1 + Hours 
Worked
Success 
Reported by 
Employer
Good Feedback 
(Greater than 
4.5)
Good Feedback 
(Given 
Feedback 
Provided)
Sample: Job Applicants Workers on First Job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Summary Data:
  Number of Affiliates 3,493 872 872 872 872 787 787 690
  Number of Non-Affiliates 47,716 4,266 4,266 4,266 4,266 3,792 3,792 3,156
  Mean of Dependent Variable: Affiliates 0.21 2.38 2.11 1.18 3.26 0.57 0.56 0.64
  Mean of Dependent Variable: Non-Affiliates 0.10 2.49 2.28 0.93 3.01 0.57 0.56 0.67
  Mean Difference Between Affiliates and Non-Affiliates 0.11 -0.11 -0.17 0.26 0.25 0.01 0.00 -0.03
Estimates:
  Oaxaca-Blinder Estimate of % Due to Agency Affiliation 78.1% 36.9% 35.9% 91.9% 99.0% 437.7% 198.0% 46.6%
  Entropy Balancing Estimate of Affiliation Effect 0.088 -0.033 -0.058 0.230 0.234 0.008 0.005 -0.021
(0.008) (0.083) (0.069) -0.0450 (0.075) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
  Entropy Balancing Estimate of Constant 0.121 2.417 2.160 0.954 3.029 0.562 0.555 0.661
  Agency Affiliation Premium from OB Decomposition 91.0% -3.9% -6.2% 23.7% 24.7% 3.9% 1.4% -2.0%
  Agency Affiliation Premium from Re-weighting 72.7% -3.3% -5.8% 23.0% 23.4% 1.4% 0.9% -3.2%
Panel C: Workers with Initial Applications or Jobs in Non Technical Jobs
Notes: The table presents mean differences between affiliates and non-affiliates for the dependent variables in each column heading. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and entropy balancing re-
weighting estimates of affiliation effects are presented below the summary statistics. The entropy balancing reweighting procedure picks a set of weights to make the first moments of the 
marginal distributions of affiliate and non-affiliate characteristics as close as possible. The reported results are from weighted regressions of the dependent variable on an agency affiliation 
indicator using these balancing weights (see Hainmuller 2012 for details). The reported standard error is the survey-weights adjusted standard error. For both the Oaxaca-Blinder and entropy 
balancing estimates, the following controls are included: the set of controls for worker characteristics and job category, month, and worker country fixed effects as specified in Table 2, plus a 
full set of project duration and weekly expected hours interactions, and the number of alpha-numeric characters in the job opening description. Month dummies account for differences in 
cohorts, including right-censoring propensities for ongoing jobs. The agency affiliation premium is again defined as the mean percentage increase or decrease in an outcome for agency 
affiliates relative to non-affiliates net of differences explained by observable characteristics. For the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, the premium is calculated relative to the set of non-
affiliates. For the re-weighting estimates, the premium is relative to a baseline of non-affiliates who have the same distribution of characteristics as the set of affiliates. In the Oaxaca-Blinder 
calculations, when the dependent variable is in logarithms, the agency affiliation premium is interpreted as a premium in levels, and is the estimated portion of the outcome gap due to agency 
affiliation that is unexplained by differences in characteristics. For the re-weighting premium, when the dependent variable is in logarithms, the premium is the point estimate from the weighted 
regression. When the dependent variable is in levels, the premium in Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions is the estimated portion of the outcome gap due to agency affiliation divided by the mean 
of the dependent variable for non-affiliates. For the re-weighting premium when the dependent variable is in levels, the premium is the point estimate for agency affiliation divided by the 
constant term. An observation in Column 1 is a unique worker who applies for at least one hourly job between 8/1/2008 and 12/28/2009. The dependent variable in Column 1 is an indicator for 
whether the worker is hired for at least one job. An observation in the remaining columns is a unique worker on the first hourly job during the same time period; there are 4,929 unique 
employers in this sample. In Columns 6 to 8, differing numbers of observations reflect that jobs may be ongoing as of 12/28/2009. In Column 7, the dependent variable is coded as zero when 
a job has been completed but the employer does not leave feedback. Column 8 drops observations where the employer does not leave feedback. 
Table 4: The Effect of Agency Affiliation on Log Hourly Wage Offers for Agency Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Indicator for Joining Affiliation 0.0858*** 0.0868** 0.0724** 0.0766** 0.0821*** 0.0786**
(0.030) (0.034) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035)
Indicator Turned On at Placebo Date 0.0322 -0.0019 -0.0083
(0.023) (0.027) (0.025)
Window in Days Before and After Affiliation Switch 4 4 4 4 4 3 2
Job Category Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of workers 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,381 1,360 1,336
Observations 8,604 8,604 8,604 8,604 8,604 7,460 6,266
R-squared 0.869 0.869 0.869 0.879 0.879 0.884 0.889
11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5% 11.5%Oaxaca-Blinder Wage Offer Premium for Switchers
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by worker in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is workers who join oDesk as non-affiliates who 
switch their affiliation status by joining an agency prior to their first date of employment. Columns 1 to 5 use a four-day window around the date that the worker 
changes affiliation status. Columns 6 and 7 use three and two day windows, respectively. All specifications include controls for the job application number, a cubic 
polynomial measuring the elapsed time since the worker's first job application, and worker fixed effects. The variable Post-Affiliation is an indicator that the worker 
has switched into an agency, meaning that the worker's profile has an affiliate identification. The placebo date in the job application history is generated as a false 
Post-Affiliation indicator prior to the actual switch time-stamp. For each bid after the first bid in the time window, a 20 percent probability is assigned that all future 
bids are classified as Post-Affiliation, and this process stops once the Placebo Indicator is turned on or the worker makes a switch to agency affiliation. The placebo 
indicator is always turned on after affiliation. The Oaxaca-Blinder wage offer premium for switchers is calculated by recovering the coefficients of the Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition using the log of the wage offer as the dependent variable in a sample of switchers and non-affiliates. With these coefficients, the premium for agency 
switchers is calculated using the characteristics of the set of switchers in the sample. The reported estimates are calculated using the same method for log wage 
premiums reported in Table 3.
Table 5: Job Finding Hazards and Agency Switchers
Hazard  Relative to Job Applications
Hazard Relative to Job 
Applications.  Time at Risk 
Begins at Application Number 15
Cox Cox Weibull Weibull Cox Weibull
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Agency Affiliate Indicator 1.349*** 1.423*** 1.218*** 1.287*** 1.262*** 1.215***
(0.0608) (0.0596) (0.0645) (0.0619) (0.0696) (0.0738)
Log Hourly Wage Bid 0.589*** 0.589***
(0.0168) (0.0167)
Has BA or higher degree 0.951* 0.961 0.923*** 0.932** 0.942 0.923*
(0.0296) (0.0305) (0.0306) (0.0312) (0.0441) (0.0458)
Has Good English Skills 1.786*** 1.826*** 1.627*** 1.652*** 1.818*** 1.786***
(0.0379) (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0392) (0.0816) (0.0830)
Taken a Skills Test 1.018 0.97 0.99 0.932 1.083 1.088
(0.0872) (0.0859) (0.0887) (0.0882) (0.125) (0.128)
Years of Prior Labor Market Experience 0.994** 0.999 0.992** 0.998 0.994 0.993
(0.00350) (0.00354) (0.00365) (0.00368) (0.00505) (0.00526)
Years of Prior Experience Missing 0.966 0.988 0.975 0.999 0.95 0.946
(0.0360) (0.0371) (0.0378) (0.0384) (0.0545) (0.0572)
Log of Weibull Shape Parameter 0.0418*** 0.0228*** -0.0226*
(0.00784) (0.00790) (0.0134)
Number of Observations 589,397 589,397 589,397 589,397 228,055 228,055
Log Likelihood -66,253 -65,400 -21,359 -20,515 -21,868 -6,963
Number of Workers 72,275 72,275 72,275 72,275 9,832 9,832
Number of Hires 7,236 7,236 7,236 7,236 2,798 2,798
Notes:  Exponentiated coefficients reported.  Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample only includes those 
workers who enter oDesk as non-affiliates; three original non-affiliates are excluded because of an issue with the recorded time of job applications. The 
agency affiliate indicator is set equal to one after a worker has joined an agency. The indicator is switched to zero if the worker subsequently leaves the 
agency. Columns 5 and 6 restrict the sample to only those workers at risk after the 15th job application, the median number of applications prior to a worker 
switching affiliation status. Cox models use Breslow methods for ties.  
Table 6: Summary Statistics on Wage Changes between Jobs
All Jobs
Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Log Wage Change Between:
    Jobs 1 and 2 0.147 0.057 0.099 0.029 0.195 0.111
    Number of workers reaching job 2 4666 2274 2317 1477 2349 797
    Jobs 1 and 2 0.142 0.058 0.095 0.032 0.190 0.106
    Jobs 2 and 3 0.127 0.037 0.108 0.032 0.144 0.046
    Jobs 1 and 3 0.270 0.094 0.203 0.064 0.334 0.151
    Number of workers reaching job 3 3674 1749 1831 1143 1843 606
    Jobs 1 and 2 0.137 0.055 0.087 0.024 0.185 0.113
    Jobs 2 and 3 0.126 0.036 0.113 0.033 0.139 0.041
    Jobs 3 and 4 0.070 0.045 0.067 0.031 0.072 0.070
    Jobs 1 and 3 0.263 0.091 0.200 0.057 0.323 0.154
    Jobs 1 and 4 0.333 0.136 0.267 0.088 0.396 0.225
    Number of workers reaching job 4 3070 1418 1489 923 1581 495
Technical Non-Technical
Notes: The sample consists of workers in the sample in Table 3, Column 2 who go onto future jobs. Wage changes are calculated using the initial contracted 
wage on each employment spell. All differences between affiliates and non-affiliates are significant at the 1% level except for the change between jobs 3 and 4, 
which is significant at the 10% level for all jobs, at the 5% level for technical jobs, and is not significant for non-technical jobs. Numbers of observations 
occasionally differ across tables depending on whether workers are required to have started billing hours or recording revenue at the end of the sample.
Table 7: Non-Affiliates' Future Employment and Wages Respond Most to Feedback
Dependent Variable Indicator for Finding a Second Job Log Wage
Sample Workers on first job Unbalanced panel of workers with 2+ total jobs 
Subsample by job type All All Tech Non Tech All All Tech Non Tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agency affiliate indicator 0.056*** 0.081*** 0.067*** 0.087***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022)
Good feedback indicator (Experienced workers in cols 5-8) 0.191*** 0.179*** 0.189*** 0.169*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.077*** 0.123***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015)
Affiliate x Good feedback score -0.043*** -0.045*** -0.062** -0.017 -0.082*** -0.070*** -0.045** -0.079***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.025) (0.038) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.027)
Zero feedback indicator (Experienced workers in cols 5-8) 0.074** 0.073*** 0.018 0.098*** -0.019 -0.012 -0.057 0.002
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.042) (0.035)
Affiliate x Zero feedback -0.037 -0.02 0.025 -0.016 0.024 0.014 0.058 -0.020
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.076) (0.038) (0.038) (0.057) (0.064)
Experienced worker indicator 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.152*** 0.196***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Affiliate x Experienced worker -0.207*** -0.172*** -0.162*** -0.154***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.029)
Number of jobs 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Affiliate x Number of jobs -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Detailed Controls No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.687 0.687 0.674 0.701 1.72 1.72 1.93 1.42
Number of Observations 10,103 10,103 4,965 5,138 54,846 54,846 31,832 23,014
R-squared 0.066 0.136 0.151 0.154 0.865 0.869 0.865 0.885
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1-4 present the results of linear probability models with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable set equal to one if a second hourly job is observed prior to August 14, 2010. An observation in these models is a unique worker on
his or her first hourly job. All specifications in Columns 1-4 have monthly time dummies, job category fixed effects, and worker country fixed effects. The specifications with
detailed controls contain the controls in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of Table 3, Column 4. Columns 5-8 present the results of fixed effects regressions with standard
errors clustered by worker in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log hourly wage recorded at the beginning of the contract. The sample includes all workers who
enter oDesk between 8/1/2008 and 12/28/2009 with two or more jobs prior to 8/14/2010. Agency affiliation is calculated as-of the first job. All specifications in Columns 5-8
include worker fixed effects, job category fixed effects and monthly time dummies.
Table 8: Summary Statistics for Experienced Workers
All Job Categories
Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates
Residual Log Hourly Rate -0.014 0.035*** -0.0170 0.033*** -0.0090 0.044***
Good English Skills Dummy 0.946 0.944 0.939 0.943* 0.957 0.948***
BA Degree or Higher 0.321 0.336*** 0.322 0.34*** 0.32 0.321
Number of Prior Hires 22.78 17.94*** 21.47 17.65*** 25.04 19.16***
Feedback Score 4.59 4.55*** 4.58 4.55*** 4.61 4.56***
Number of Jobs 65,763 27,110 41,765 21,997 23,981 5,064
Number of Experienced Workers 9,489 2,640 6,389 2,235 3,100 405
Technical Jobs Non-Technical Jobs
Notes: Asterisks indicate that two-sample t-tests with unequal variances reject equality of the means for the non-affiliates' and affiliates' at the 1-percent, ***,  5-
percent, **, and 10-percent, *, level. The sample contains workers with three or more total hires and non-zero feedback who are hired for the third or more job 
before 12/28/2009. In this sample there is no restriction that a workers' first job application occurred after 8/1/2008. The number of total hires multiplied by the 
number of experienced workers does not equal the number of jobs because a worker's first three jobs or jobs prior to 8/1/2008 are not included in the sample. 
Because some workers are employed in both technical and non-technical jobs, the number of experienced workers in technical and non-technical categories is 
based on a classification of workers into their modal job type.
Table 9: Analysis of Agencies Over Time
Subsample by agency history
All
Only Agency with Complete Histories                (Established After 
8/1/2008)
Subsample by agency modal job type All Tech Non Tech All Tech Non Tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unique Workers Hired Previously Under Agency Id -0.0043 -0.0021 0.0071 0.0025 0.0122 0.0036
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0345) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0349)
Workers Hired Squared 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0012
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012)
Mean of Dependent Variable 2.03 2.35 1 1.79 2.25 0.96
Number of Observations 3,231 2,433 712 1,918 1,211 637
R-squared 0.897 0.806 0.896 0.925 0.896 0.898
Unique Workers Hired Previously Under Agency Id -0.0037 -0.0041 0.0038 0.0035 0.0027 0.0073
(0.0074) (0.008) (0.0304) (0.0131) (0.0152) (0.0319)
Workers Hired Squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0 0 0.0004
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0012)
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.69 0.71 0.62 0.69 0.73 0.63
Number of Observations 2,424 1,795 565 1,512 956 504
R-squared 0.546 0.499 0.724 0.639 0.624 0.736
Good Feedback for Worker 0.831*** 0.827** 0.86 0.824*** 0.817** 0.852
(0.056) (0.071) (0.088) (0.060) (0.077) (0.091)
No Feedback for Worker 0.906 0.912 0.853 0.919 0.931 0.875
(0.067) (0.084) (0.102) (0.072) (0.095) (0.104)
Number of Observations 4,938 3,861 1,077 2,826 1,849 977
Number of Agencies 1,126 791 826 868 562 306
Number of Exits 830 564 653 675 432 243
Notes:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The number of previous unique workers hired under the agency id is calculated as of the time of hire for the worker in question, but the calculation begins for workers hired 
after August 1, 2008.  For agencies in existence prior to August 1, 2008, it is not possible to calculate the number of unique workers prior to this date, so the number of unique agency affiliates begins when it is 
possible to begin tracking affiliation in the job application database. Columns 4-6 restrict the sample to agencies established after 8/1/2008. These agencies have complete histories. The specifications in Panels 
A and B contain agency fixed effects, detailed job category fixed effects, month fixed effects and the same controls for worker characteristics as the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions in Table 3, Column 4. In 
Panel C, the dependent variable is an indicator that the worker is the last affiliate. The sample in Panel C is extended beyond the main sample period to better allow classification of agency exit. An exit is 
classified as never observing a new worker after the worker in question and August 14, 2010. Agencies with final workers observed after January 14, 2010 are treated as censored, with no exit time recorded. 
Panel C contains calendar time fixed effects and job category fixed effects, with robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Panel A:  Dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage for new agency affiliates on their first hourly job.  Regressions contain fixed effects for each agency id and controls as detailed in the notes.
Panel B:  Dependent Variable is an indicator for a good feedback score for new agency affiliates on their first hourly job.  Regressions contain fixed effects for each agency id and controls as detailed in the notes.  
Missing feedback scores are excluded.
Panel C:  Dependent variable is an indicator that the observed affiliate is the last affiliate under the agency id.  Exponentiated coefficients of Cox proportional hazards models with detailed job category and time 
fixed effects are reported.
Table 10: Analysis of Attrition from Agencies As a Function of First Job Performance and Characteristics
Sample All Jobs
Affiliates with First Jobs in 
Technical Categories
Affiliates with First Jobs in Non-
Technical Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Hourly Wage -0.012** -0.005 -0.016*** -0.004 -0.007 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.017)
Good Feedack for Worker Indicator 0.006 0.005 -0.000 0.002 0.017 0.035
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.019) (0.022)
No Feedback for Worker Indicator 0.001 0.005 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007 0.036
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.021) (0.032)
Worker with BA or Higher Degree -0.002 0.008 0.001 0.006 -0.012 0.022
(0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.031)
Worker with Good English Skills -0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.005 0.005 -0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.020)
Taken a Test 0.008 -0.003 0.003 -0.006 0.010 -0.043
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.030) (0.038)
Agency Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Mean of DV 0.025 0.025 0.015 0.015 0.052 0.052
Number of Observations 3,231 3,231 2,359 2,359 872 872
R-squared 0.135 0.757 0.147 0.821 0.154 0.804
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator that the worker formally leaves the agency of record on the first job any time after the first hire. Job category, month of
first job, and country fixed effects are included in all specifications. The log hourly wage and feedback scores are measured from each worker's first hire. The other
worker characteristics included are the same as those in the Oaxaca-Blinder wage decompositions in Table 3.
Table 11: Detailed Decomposition from Pooled Regressions to Assess Heterogeneous Agency Benefits
Dependent Variable
Log 1 + Elapsed Days 
of Job Search
Log Applications Prior 
to Initial Hire
Log Hourly Wage Log 1 + Hours Worked
Success Reported by 
Employer
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
Non-
Affiliate 
Baseline
Affiliate 
Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Affiliate Characteristics:
Has BA or higher degree 0.393*** -0.137* 0.121*** -0.022 -0.012 0.019 0.023 -0.005 -0.001 0.008 -0.006 0.023 0.008 0.008
(0.0416) (0.0789) (0.0247) (0.0503) (0.0196) (0.0313) (0.0470) (0.0808) (0.0145) (0.0270) (0.0148) (0.0273) (0.0150) (0.0277)
Has Good English Skills 0.501*** -0.243*** 0.459*** -0.119** 0.009 -0.001 -0.075 0.039 0.0704** -0.0551* 0.021 0.020 0.017 0.034
(0.0606) (0.0915) (0.0375) (0.0554) (0.0285) (0.0408) (0.0727) (0.104) (0.0216) (0.0330) (0.0216) (0.0332) (0.0223) (0.0337)
Years of Prior Labor Market Experience 0.008 0.008 0.00611** 0.013 0.00941*** -0.002 0.007 -0.011 0.00337* 0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 0.005
(0.0050) (0.0117) (0.00302) (0.00785) (0.00257) (0.00535) (0.00655) (0.0137) (0.00183) (0.00446) (0.00190) (0.00442) (0.00194) (0.00443)
Taken a Skills Test 0.434*** 0.003 0.372*** -0.087 0.038 0.023 -0.192** 0.214* -0.034 0.037 -0.015 0.029 0.005 -0.010
(0.0739) (0.125) (0.0455) (0.0817) (0.0327) (0.0487) (0.0812) (0.126) (0.0256) (0.0420) (0.0261) (0.0423) (0.0264) (0.0432)
Indicators for Team Production:
Indicator for Team-Based Job 0.029 -0.022 0.0565** 0.029 -0.239*** 0.114** -0.0847* -0.243** -0.0694*** 0.0724** 0.0415** -0.0512* 0.0291** -0.0715**
(0.0390) (0.0820) (0.0237) (0.0531) (0.0184) (0.0340) (0.0453) (0.0868) (0.0140) (0.0283) (0.0143) (0.0288) (0.0147) (0.0297)
Indicator for Affiliate on an Agency Team -0.319*** -0.265*** 0.106** 0.327*** -0.002 0.109*** 0.152***
(0.0762) (0.0498) (0.0315) (0.0794) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0258)
% of Workers in Team-Based Jobs 64.1% 55.8% 64.1% 55.8% 64.1% 55.8% 64.1% 55.8% 65.9% 56.3% 65.9% 56.3% 66.3% 56.5%
% of Affiliates on an Agency-Based Team 0.0% 33.0% 0.0% 33.0% 0.0% 33.0% 0.0% 33.0% 0.0% 32.8% 0.0% 32.8% 0.0% 32.1%
Agency Premium Accounting For Teams -23.7% -19.1% 22.7% 33.1% 9.9% 0.5% 2.8%
Premium Removing Agency Teams -12.4% -11.3% 15.4% 30.3% 5.9% -2.8% -1.0%
Number of Non-Affiliates and Affiliates 6,872 3,231 6,872 3,231 6,872 3,231 6,872 3,231 6,046 2,822 6,046 2,822 5,144 2,424
Good Feedback 
(Greater than 4.5)
Good Feedback (Non-
Missing Feedback Sub-
Sample)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are derived from a pooled regression with a full set of interactions for agency affiliates. Team-Based Jobs are defined based on an employer hiring within a 7-day 
window around a worker's hiring date. Agency teams are defined similarly for workers of the same agency. The "Agency Premium Removing Agency Teams From Premium" calculation is conducted by taking the 
"Unexplained" difference in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and then subtracting both the sum of the coefficient on agency teams times the percentage of workers on agency teams and the difference in the affiliate 
and non-affiliate coefficient on team-based jobs times the adjusted mean percentage of affiliates on agency teams as detailed in the text. This calculation assumes that agency team-based jobs would revert to being 
individual jobs rather than team-based with workers from outside of the agency at approximately the same rate at which team based jobs are observed in the data for agency affiliates. When splitting the sample into 
technical and non-technical jobs, 51.4% of non-affiliates' technical jobs are classified as team-based jobs, 51.2% of affiliates' technical jobs are team-based, and 33.1% of affiliates' technical jobs are agency-team based 
jobs. In non-technical categories, 71.8% of non-affiliates' jobs are team-based, while 68.2% of affiliates' jobs are team-based and 32.8% of affiliates' jobs are agency-team based.
Table 12: Teamwork Explains A Small Fraction of the Over-Career Variation in the Affiliation Premium
Dependent Variable Indicator for Finding a Second Job Log Wage
Sample Workers on first job Unbalanced panel of workers with 2+ total jobs 
Subsample All All Tech Non Tech All All Tech Non Tech
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agency affiliate indicator 0.0701*** 0.103*** 0.0784*** 0.103***
(0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0202) (0.0275)
Good feedback indicator (Experienced workers in cols 5-8) 0.169*** 0.179*** 0.190*** 0.169*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.076*** 0.122***
(0.0161) (0.00767) (0.0142) (0.0161) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.015)
Affiliate x Good feedback score -0.0171 -0.0444*** -0.0589** -0.0198 -0.071*** -0.070*** -0.045*** -0.079***
(0.0378) (0.0163) (0.0251) (0.0359) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026)
Zero feedback indicator (Experienced workers in cols 5-8) 0.0982*** 0.0727*** 0.0159 0.0989*** -0.011 -0.011 -0.058 0.003
(0.0225) (0.0267) (0.0271) (0.0219) (0.025) (0.025) (0.042) (0.035)
Affiliate x Zero feedback -0.0164 -0.0207 0.0283 -0.0196 0.013 0.014 0.061 -0.019
(0.0756) (0.0304) (0.0293) (0.0737) (0.038) (0.038) (0.056) (0.064)
Indicator for Team-based Job -0.0148 -0.00162 -0.0240 0.0133 -0.063*** -0.083*** -0.061*** -0.098***
(0.0139) (0.0129) (0.0296) (0.0158) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
Affiliate x Indicator for Team-based Job -0.00613 -0.0412** -0.0241 -0.0301 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.021 0.038
(0.0169) (0.0166) (0.0346) (0.0404) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) (0.028)
Indicator for Affiliate on an Agency Team -0.0512*** 0.00721 -0.00306 0.0236 -0.028*** -0.003 -0.004 0.018
(0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.010) (0.013) (0.016) (0.028)
Experienced worker indicator 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.150*** 0.192***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Affiliate x Experienced worker -0.170*** -0.172*** -0.162*** -0.154***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.029)
Number of jobs 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Affiliate x Number of jobs -0.005*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Trend x Indicator for Team Job 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Affiliate x Trend x Indicator for Team Job  0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Affiliate x Trend x Indicator for Agency Team Job -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Detailed Controls No Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Mean of Dependent Variable 0.687 0.687 0.674 0.701 1.72 1.72 1.93 1.42
Number of Observations 10,103 10,103 4,965 5,138 54,846 54,846 31,832 23,014
R-squared 0.067 0.137 0.153 0.154 0.870 0.870 0.866 0.886
Notes: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. All specifications parallel Table 7 but add the indicated measures for team-based jobs. Team-based jobs are defined based on an employer hiring another worker within a 7-day window around a
worker's hiring date. Agency teams are defined similarly for workers of the same agency. 
Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions and Measurement
Measure Name Description Time of Measurement
Job Characteristics
Detailed Job Category The category chosen by the employer when posting a job.  The most common job category is Web Development, 
followed by Administrative Support.  Specifications with job category fixed effects contain dummy variables for each of 
the 10 main job categories.
At time of job posting.
Technical Job An indicator that the job is listed under categories Web Development, Software Development, Networking and Info 
Systems, 3D Modeling and CAD, Engineering and Technical Design, or Search Engine Optimization. Non-technical 
jobs (indicated with a zero) include Administrative Support, Business Services, Customer Services, Sales and 
Marketing, and Writing and Translation.
At time of job posting.
Expected Duration and Hours 
Per Week
Interactions of the employer's posted estimate of the expected duration in calendar time (5 categories) that the job will 
require and the required hours of work per week (3 categories).
At time of job posting.
Characters in Job Post The number of alpha-numeric characters returned in a SQL query of the job description. At time of job posting.
Team-Based Job An indicator that an employer hires another worker within a 7-day window around a worker's hire date. At time of hire.
Agency-Team Job
An indicator that an employer hires another worker from the same agency within a 7-day window around an agency 
affiliated worker's hire date.
At time of hire.
Worker Resume Characteristics
Agency Affiliate The worker's affiliation status. Data collected at end of sample period from a database table that records 
dates of switches if status was changed.  If a worker never has a recorded 
status change in the database table, then agency affiliation is taken from the 
job application transaction data.  Each piece of analysis makes clear how 
affiliation status changes are treated.
English Ability Self-reported English proficiency on a 5 point scale.  Workers reporting English ability greater than or equal to 4 are 
classified as having "good English skills."
End of sample period.
Years of Experience Years of labor market experience prior to joining oDesk.  In specifications with controls for worker characteristics, 
years of experience enters linearly and a dummy variable is included for those workers who do not report the measure.
End of sample period, adjusted for oDesk start date.
Education Self-reported educational credentials, with structured selections for common degrees.  Specifications with controls for 
worker characteristics include a dummy variable for reporting a  bachelors degree equivalent or higher.
End of sample period.
Test Scores Records of publicly available scores on over 300 different skills tests.  In specifications with controls for worker 
characteristics, tests are grouped into categories defined by oDesk corresponding to the underlying skill group, with 
the maximum score in the group and an indicator for the presence of at least one public test for each test category.  
The most frequently observed tests are in English language skills, followed by office skills, followed by programming 
skills.  
Data collected at end of sample period from a database table that records 
dates of test results.  Test scores were calculated retrospectively to reflect 
only information observable at the time of a workers' first hire or first 
application.
Appendix Table 1, Contd.: Variable Definitions and Measurement
Measure Name Description Time of Measurement
Worker Resume Characteristics, continued.
Country Worker's country. End of sample period.
Revenue and Number of Hires 
on Fixed Price Projects
The worker's past revenue and number of hires on fixed price contracts.  In specifications with controls for worker 
characteristics, both measures enter linearly. Fixed price jobs are less frequently posted and filled during the sample 
period, and they have much lower average wage bills than hourly jobs.
At time of job application or hire.
Number of Hires on Hourly 
Projects
The worker's past number of hires on hourly contracts.  See notes on individual specifications when this measure is 
used.
At time of job application or hire.
Current Feedback Score The feedback score as a potential employer would see it.  Includes feedback from fixed price and hourly projects.  In 
models for workers' initial hourly jobs, any feedback from prior fixed price jobs enters linearly.  See notes on individual 
specifications for other uses of this measure.
Data collected at end of sample period from a database table that records 
dates of feedback updates.  For the empirical work, feedback scores were 
reverse-engineered using the oDesk revenue-weighting scheme to reflect the 
information observable to employers at the time of the job application or hire.
Worker and Job Outcomes
Hourly Bid and Hourly Rate The workers' hourly bid when applying for a project and hourly rate of pay received upon successfully receiving the job.  
On contracts with rate changes, the first hourly rate with billing is used.
At time of job application or hire.
Total Hours Worked The number of hours recorded in the oDesk billing system. End of sample period.  This is the final number of hours if a contract has 
been completed or the number as-of the end of the sample for ongoing 
contracts.
Good Feedback Score Indicator that the feedback score left for the worker was greater than 4.5 out of 5.  After job ends.
Project Success Indicator that the employer reported the job was completed successfully on a post-project survey. After job ends.
Appendix Table 2: Duration of Job Search Prior to Finding the First Hourly-Paying Job
Hazard Relative to Time (Scale is Days of Search) Hazard  Relative to Job Applications
Cox Cox Weibull Weibull Cox Cox Weibull Weibull
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Agency Affiliate Indicator 2.12*** 2.039*** 2.124*** 2.051*** 1.59*** 1.618*** 1.481*** 1.57***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045)
Log Hourly Wage Bid 0.682*** 0.685*** 0.658*** 0.651***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Has BA or higher degree 0.828*** 0.839*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.94*** 0.963*** 0.916*** 0.95***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Has Good English Skills 1.843*** 1.939*** 1.734*** 1.81*** 1.476*** 1.547*** 1.316*** 1.33***
(0.055) (0.062) (0.052) (0.059) (0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.043)
Taken a Skills Test 1.211*** 1.295*** 1.159*** 1.245*** 1.139*** 1.194*** 1.111*** 1.133***
(0.048) (0.052) (0.047) (0.051) (0.047) (0.05) (0.048) (0.05)
Years of Prior Labor Market Experience 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.995 0.999 0.992 0.997
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Prior Experience Missing 0.978 0.967 0.989 0.974 0.979 0.988 0.972 1.002
(0.03) (0.03) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Log of Weibull Shape Parameter -0.887*** -0.948*** -0.128*** -0.03***
(0.007) (0.01) (0.007) (0.009)
Number of Observations 764,215 764,215 764,215 764,215 764,535 764,535 764,535 764,535
Log Likelihood -100,689 -99,598 -40,964 -39,906 -96,459 -95,677 -31,267 -30,276
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. There are 10,103 workers who find jobs out of  the total sample of job 
applicants, with characteristics reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. In this analysis, the agency affiliate indicator is fixed over the worker's career. Workers 
who find their first job as affiliates or non-affiliates are classified as such for the duration of their job search. Otherwise, the worker's affiliation is calculated as of 
the time of the first bid. Table 5 separately considers job-finding hazards for those workers who switch into agencies. 408 of the workers in this sample are 
classified as affiliates after entering oDesk as non-affiliates because they find jobs as affiliates. 22 workers are classified as non-affiliates because after entering 
oDesk as affiliates, they find jobs as non-affiliates. Cox models use Breslow methods for ties.  
Appendix Table 3: The Effect of Revealing a Test Score on Wage Offers
Test: PHP 5 html Email Etiquette English Spelling General English MS Office
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A:  Non-affiilate test takers with job applications within a 4-day window of score revelation
After Score Revealed -0.0471 0.0630 -0.0908*** -0.0541** -0.00904 -0.00667
(0.0490) (0.0408) (0.0288) (0.0233) (0.0241) (0.0266)
Observations 1,489 2,007 7,428 9,891 15,648 9,858
R-squared 0.851 0.874 0.704 0.727 0.780 0.704
Panel B:  Pooled sample of affiliate and non-affiliate test takers with job applications in a 4-day window of 
revealing a score above the 90th percentile of the distribution
After Score in the 90th Percentile Revealed -0.0540 -0.00764 -0.127** -0.00101 -0.0218 0.00135
(0.0572) (0.0454) (0.0543) (0.0863) (0.280) (0.0435)
Affiliate x Score in the 90th Percentile 0.0564 0.0785 -0.0287 -0.199* -0.113 0.114
(0.0747) (0.0551) (0.0736) (0.105) (0.224) (0.0865)
Observations 591 326 883 762 283 1,855
R-squared 0.847 0.933 0.823 0.733 0.941 0.702
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by worker in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample in Panel A is non-affiliates who have job applications within a 
4 day window of the revelation of a test score. The sample in Panel B includes agency affiliates and non-affiliates who reveal a test score above the 90th percentile of the 
distribution. The dependent variable in all regressions is the log wage offer in a job application. All specifications include controls for the job application number, a cubic 
polynomial measuring the elapsed time since the worker's first job application, worker fixed effects and job category fixed effects.  
Online Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics for Workers, including U.S. workers
All Applicants for Hourly Jobs Workers Hired Once or More Workers Hired Twice or More
Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates Non-Affiliates Affiliates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of workers with first applications between 8/1/2008 and 
12/28/2009, including workers in the U.S.
112,943 12,276 9,376 3,390 6,697 2,628
Share of Affiliates and of Non-Affiliates in: 
Technical Jobs 0.28 0.66 0.34 0.72 0.34 0.72
Non-Technical Jobs 0.72 0.34 0.66 0.28 0.66 0.28
India/Pakistan 0.17 0.48 0.18 0.52 0.20 0.53
Russia/Ukraine 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.11
The Philippines 0.22 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.31 0.11
United States 0.36 0.12 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.04
Mean Characteristics by Group:
Log Hourly Wage on First Job (First Application in Columns 1-2) 2.19 2.26 1.58 2.05 1.50 2.02
Bachelors Degree or Higher, Indicator 0.23 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.42 0.34
Good English Skills, Indicator 0.55 0.80 0.87 0.80 0.91 0.83
Skills Tests Taken, Indicator 0.39 0.36 0.71 0.50 0.76 0.54
Years of Prior Experience 6.69 4.32 6.45 4.24
Mean Career Earnings Through 8/14/2010 [a], $ 320 1,642 3,245 6,095 3,512 5,515
Earnings Gap Due to Affiliation from Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 68% 47% 33.8%
Affiliation Earnings Premium 2.81 0.42 0.19
[a]  Total Earnings for workers in Columns 5 and 6 are calculated for jobs after the first job.
Notes: See notes for Table 2 in the text.
Online Appendix Table 2:  Summary Statistics about Tests. The Unit of Analysis is a Worker on the First Job.
Non-Affiliates Affiliates
Category of Skills Test
Number of 
Workers With 
Public Tests
Mean of 
Maximum 
Score in 
Category
Standard 
Deviation
Number of 
Workers With 
Public Tests
Mean of 
Maximum 
Score in 
Category
Standard 
Deviation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Administrative and Basic Computer Use 3195 75.24 21.56 590 75.52 21.70
Programming 552 75.51 20.23 355 77.58 19.84
Web Development 1091 72.99 20.74 774 76.60 20.43
English 3746 51.91 26.65 689 46.17 26.18
Databases 339 76.04 18.57 219 78.66 17.25
Design 1343 67.03 23.73 712 74.30 22.53
Notes: The sample consists of workers on the first hire corresponding to Table 3. Counts of the number of workers with public tests give the number of workers with at least 
one public test score in each category of skills tests. For each of these workers, the maximum score in the category is used in the analysis, and the mean and standard 
deviations are taken across workers.
